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OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION AND SALE STRATEGIES FOR A RISK AVERSE
AGENT
DAVID HOBSON AND YEQI ZHU
Abstrat. In this artile we onsider an optimal onsumption/optimal portfolio problem in
whih an agent with onstant relative risk aversion seeks to maximise expeted disounted utility
of onsumption over the innite horizon, in a model omprising a risk-free asset and a risky asset
in whih the risky asset an only be sold and not bought.
The problem is an extension of the Merton problem and a speial ase of the transation osts
model of Constantinides-Magill and Davis-Norman. Via various transforms we are able to make
onsiderable progress towards an analytial solution. The solution an be expressed via a rst
rossing problem for an initial-value, rst order ODE.
The fat that we have a relatively expliit solution means we are able to onsider the ompar-
ative statis of the problem. There are some surprising onlusions, suh as onsumption rates
are not monotone inreasing in the return of the asset, nor are the ertainty equivalent values of
the risky positions monotone in the risk aversion.
Key words: Optimal onsumption/investment problem, transation osts, sale strategy, reet-
ing diusion, loal time.
AMS subjet lassiations: 91G10, 93E20
1. Introdution
This artile is onerned with the optimal behaviour of an agent whose goal is to maximise the
expeted disounted utility of onsumption, and who nanes onsumption from a ombination of
initial wealth and from the sale of an initial endowment of an innitely divisible seurity. Her ations
are to hoose an optimal onsumption strategy and an optimal holding or portfolio of a risky seurity,
under the restrition that the risky asset an only be sold, and purhases are not permitted. As
suh this problem is a extension of the Merton [21℄ optimal onsumption/optimal portfolio problem
and a speial ase of a onsumption/investment problem with proportional transation osts.
Merton [21℄ onsidered portfolio optimisation and onsumption in a ontinuous-time stohasti
model, with an investment opportunity set omprising a risk-free bond and a risky asset with on-
stant return and volatility. Merton hose to study these issues by rst understanding the behaviour
of a single agent ating as a prie-taker. Under an assumption of onstant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) he obtained a losed form solution to the problem and the optimal strategy in his model
onsists of trading ontinuously in order to keep the fration of wealth invested in the risky seurity
equal to a onstant.
Merton's model was subsequently generalised to an inomplete nanial market setting where
perfet hedging is no longer possible. Constantinides and Magill [4℄ (see also Constantinides [3℄)
introdued proportional transation osts to the model and onsidered an investor whose aim is to
maximise the expeted utility of onsumption over an innite horizon under power utility. They
onjetured the existene of a `no-transation' region, and that it is optimal to keep the proportion
of wealth invested in the risky asset within some interval. Subsequently Davis and Norman [5℄ gave
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a preise formulation. The Davis and Norman [5℄ analysis of the problem via stohasti ontrol is
a landmark in the study of transation ost problems. This analysis was extended using visosity
solutions by Shreve and Soner [23℄.
Reently there have been a series of papers onsidering the problem from the dual perspetive
using the the onept of shadow pries. Kallsen and Muhle-Karbe [16℄ onsider an agent with
logarithmi utility, and their results are extended to power utility by Herzegh and Prokaj [11℄.
Choi et al [2℄ give a deep analysis of the solution of the problem, inluding several singular ases,
and give a omplete analysis of the parameter ombinations for whih a solution exists.
In this artile we onsider a speial ase of the transation ost model in whih the transation
osts assoiated with purhases of the risky asset are innite. Eetively purhases are disallowed,
and we may think of an agent who is endowed with a quantity of an asset whih she may sell,
but whih she may not trade dynamially. There are at least two main reasons for onsidering this
speial ase. First, there are often situations whereby agents are endowed with units of assets whih
they may sell but may not repurhase, whether for legal reasons or beause of liquidity or trading
restritions. Seond, our situation may be thought of as an approximation of the large transation
ost regime.
The dual method via shadow pries has been exploited to great suess. Nonetheless, one of the
advantages of the primal method whih fousses on the value funtion (expressed via the solution
of a dierential equation problem with free boundary) is that is possible to alulate the optimal
onsumption and investment strategy and the ertainty equivalent value of the holding of risky
asset diretly. For example, the optimal onsumption is given in terms of a derivative of the value
funtion. In general omparative statis are available more diretly from the primal approah.
In this paper we take the lassial, stohasti ontrol approah to the primal problem, plaing us
in the tradition of [5, 23℄ rather than the shadow prie literature [16, 11, 2℄. Our methods arguably
lead to simpler set of governing equations than those that arise from the shadow prie method (see
Setion 4.1 for a omparison). In the setting of the sale problem we study the omparative statis
of the problem. To the best of our knowledge this has not been attempted via the shadow-prie
approah, and would appear to be quite hallenging even under the urrent best formulation of this
method.
The next two setions desribe the main results, rst informally, and then more preisely. Then,
in Setion 4, we give the heuristis behind the results, whih are proved in Setion 5 (and the
appendies). A nal setion disusses the omparative statis in the model.
2. Related literature and main onlusions
2.1. Related literature. Davis and Norman [5℄ were the rst to study the Merton model with
proportional transation osts in a mathematially preise formulation. They showed that under
optimal behaviour the no transation region is a wedge ontaining the Merton line and that the
optimal buying and selling strategies are loal times at boundaries hosen to keep the proess inside
the wedge. In the transation region, transations take plae at innite speed and exept for the
initial transation, all transations take plae at the boundaries. They obtained their results by
writing down the (non-linear, seond order) Hamilton-Jaobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with free
boundary onditions and then by a series of transformations reduing the problem to one of solving
a system of rst order ordinary dierential equations. Motivated by Davis and Norman's work,
Shreve and Soner [23℄ studied the same problem but with an approah via visosity solutions. They
reovered the results of Davis and Norman [5℄ without imposing all of the onditions of [5℄.
Kallsen and Muhle-Karbe [16℄ were the rst to onsider using the shadow prie method. They
restrited attention to the ase of logarithmi utility and showed that the approah ould be used
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both to develop a andidate solution and to prove a veriation result. Further, they showed it was
possible to determine the shadow prie proess. Herzegh and Prokaj [11℄ extended the results to
a power-law investor. In the logarithmi ase the optimal onsumption plan is relatively simple,
so one of the ontributions of Herzegh and Prokaj was to develop a heuristi for solving for the
optimal onsumption, and thene the shadow prie in the power-law ase. At about the same
time, and independently, Choi et al [2℄ also undertook a detailed study of the problem for a power-
law investor. In their main result they determine preisely for whih parameter ombinations the
problem is well-posed, and they go on to give an expression for the shadow prie via the solution
of a dierential equation.
In related work, Due and Sun [7℄, Liu [19℄ and Korn [20℄ study the problem when there are xed
(as opposed to proportional) transation osts. Liu used the HJB approah, deriving an ordinary
dierential equation to haraterise the value funtion and solving it numerially. He found that if
there is only a xed transation ost, the optimal trading strategy is to trade to a ertain target
amount as soon as the fration of wealth in stok goes outside a ertain range. Korn [20℄ solved
a similar problem by an impulse ontrol and optimal stopping approah. He proved the Bellman
priniple and solved for the reward funtion by an iteration proedure under the assumption that
the value funtion is nite.
Whilst nanial assets an often be atively traded, in other ontexts dynami trading is not
possible. Svensson and Werner [24℄ were the rst to onsider the problem of priing non-traded
assets in Merton's model. More generally, it is a standard assumption in the Real Options literature
(see Dixit and Pindyk [6℄) that the underlying asset is not liquidly traded. An agent an sell the
asset, but annot purhase any units. In the simplest ase the agent is endowed with a single unit
of an indivisible asset whih annot be traded and the problem redues to an optimal sale problem
for an asset. Evans et al [8℄, see also Henderson and Hobson [13℄, onsider an agent with power-law
utility who owns an indivisible, non-traded asset and wishes to hoose the optimal time to sell the
asset in order to maximise the expeted utility of terminal wealth in an inomplete market. Their
results show that the optimal riterion for the sale of the asset is to sell the rst time the value
of the non-traded asset exeeds a ertain proportion of the agent's trading wealth and this ritial
threshold is governed by a transendental equation.
A seond appliation where our assumption that the agent annot atively trade is reasonable is
in the ontext of exeutive stok options. Legal restritions (see Carpenter [1℄) mean that exeutives
annot short sell stok on their own ompany. If exeutives are ompensated with a large tranhe
of options, then they might wish to hedge their position by selling stok and the restrition on short
sales beomes an impliit bar on any trading. Often, in the mathematial nane literature (see
Grasselli and Henderson [10℄ and Leung and Sirar [18℄) the simple assumption is made that legal
restritions prevent the agent from any trading in the underlying asset.
2.2. Informal statement of the main onlusions. This paper onsiders an individual who is
endowed with ash and units of an innitely divisible asset, whih an be sold but not dynamially
traded, and who aims to maximise the expeted disounted utility of onsumption over an innite
horizon. (The ase of an indivisible asset is onsidered by Henderson and Hobson [14℄.) The
problem faing the individual is to hoose the optimal strategy for the liquidation of the endowed
asset portfolio, and an optimal onsumption proess hosen to keep ash wealth non-negative. The
prie proess of the endowed asset is assumed to follow an exponential Brownian motion and the
agent is assumed to have onstant relative risk aversion.
The onstraint that the asset an be sold but not bought is equivalent to an assumption of no
transation osts on sales, and an innite transation ost on purhases. (The assumption of no
transation ost on sales an easily be relaxed to a proportional transation ost on sales by working
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with a proess representing the post-transation-ost prie rather than the pre-ost prie.) In this
sense the problem we onsider an be interpreted as a speial ase of the Davis-Norman problem
for Merton's model with transation osts in whih the transation ost assoiated with buying the
endowed asset is innite.
Our main results are of three types. First we are able to ompletely lassify the dierent types
of optimal strategies and the parameter ranges over whih they apply. Seond, we an simplify
the problem of solving for the value funtion, espeially when ompared with diret approahes for
solving the HJB equation via smooth t. Third, we an perform omparative statis on quantities
of interest, and unover some surprising impliations of the model.
Some of our main results are as follows.
Result 1. If the endowed asset is depreiating over time then the investor should sell immediately.
Conversely, if the mean return is too strong and the oeient of relative risk aversion is less than
unity, then the problem is ill-posed, and provided the initial holding of the endowed asset is positive
the value funtion is innite.
Otherwise, there are two ases. For small and positive mean return there exists a nite ritial
ratio and the optimal sale strategy for the endowed asset is to sell just enough to keep the ratio
of wealth held in the endowed asset to ash wealth below this ritial ratio. For larger returns
it is optimal to rst onsume all ash wealth, and one this ash wealth is exhausted to nane
onsumption through sales of the endowed asset.
Result 2. In the ase where the ritial ratio is nite then it is given via the solution of a rst
rossing problem for a rst-order initial-value ordinary dierential equation (ODE). Other quantities
of interest an be expressed in terms of the solution of this ODE. In the ase where the ritial ratio
is innite, the value funtion an again be expressed in terms of the solution of a rst-order ODE.
Result 3. We give three sample onlusions from the omparative statis:
(1) The optimal onsumption proess is not monotone in the drift of the endowed asset. Al-
though we might expet that the higher the drift, the more the agent would onsume, some-
times the agent's onsumption is a dereasing funtion of the drift.
(2) The ertainty equivalent value of the holdings of the risky asset is not monotone in risk
aversion. For small quantities of endowed asset, the ertainty equivalent value is inreasing
in risk aversion, while for larger quantities, it is dereasing.
(3) The ost of illiquidity (see Denition 26 below), representing the loss in welfare of the agent
when ompared with an otherwise idential agent who an buy and sell the risky asset with
zero transation osts, is a U-shaped funtion of the size of the endowment in the risky
asset.
We work with bond as numéraire (so that interest rate eets an be ignored) and then the
relevant parameters are the disount parameter and the relative risk aversion of the agent, and the
drift and volatility of the prie proess of the risky asset. In the non-degenerate parameter ases the
agent faes a onit between the inentive to keep a large holding in the risky asset (sine it has a
positive return) and the inentive to sell in order to minimise risk exposure. From the homotheti
property we expet deisions to depend on the ratio between the value of the holdings of risky asset
and ash wealth.
The HJB equation for our problem is seond order, non-linear and subjet to value mathing and
smooth t of the rst and seond derivatives at an unknown free-boundary. One of our ontributions
is to show that the problem an be redued to a rossing problem for the solution of a rst order
ODE. (Choi et al [2℄ and Herzegh and Prokaj [11℄ also redue the problem to a rst order ODE, but
ours appears simpler in two ways. First, we have an initial value problem. This is a result of the fat
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that we do not allow sales. Seond, the ODE itself is simpler to analyse, beause the set of andidate
rossing points is expressed via a quadrati funtion (rather than an ellipse or hyperbola as in [2℄.)
This big simpliation (ompared with [5, 23℄) is useful both when onsidering analytial properties
of the solution, and when trying to onstrut a solution numerially. We lassify the parameter
ombinations whih lead to dierent types of solutions and provide a thorough analysis of the
existene and niteness of the ritial ratio, and the orresponding optimal strategies. In the ase
of a nite and positive ritial ratio we show how the solution to the problem an be haraterised
by an autonomous one-dimensional diusion proess with reetion and its loal time.
The struture of the paper is as follows. First, we give a preise desription of the model and then
a statement of the main results. The HJB equation for the problem is seond order and non-linear,
but a hange of variable makes the equation homogeneous and then a hange of dependent variable
redues the order. Hene the form of the solution is governed by the solution of a rst rossing
problem of an initial value problem for a rst order ODE. Even though losed-form solutions of
this ODE are not available we an provide a omplete haraterisation of when the rst rossing
problem has a solution, and given a solution of the rst rossing problem we show how to onstrut
the (andidate) value funtion. There are two types of degenerate solution (in one ase it is always
optimal to liquidate all units of the risky asset immediately, and in the other the value funtion is
innite and the problem is ill-posed). In addition there are two dierent types of non-degenerate
behaviour (in one ase the agent sells units of asset in order to keep the proportion of wealth held
in the risky asset below a ertain level, and in the other the agent exhausts all her ash reserves
before selling any units of the risky asset.) We give proofs of all the main results, although tehnial
details of the veriation arguments are sometimes relegated to the appendies.
One the analysis of the problem is omplete we are in a position to onsider the omparative
statis of the problem. We onsider the omparative statis of the ritial ratio, the value funtion,
the optimal onsumption, the ertainty equivalent value of the portfolio and the ost of illiquidity.
3. The model and main results
We work on a ltered probability spae
(
Ω,F ,P, (Ft)t≥0
)
suh that the ltration satises the
usual onditions and is generated by a standard Brownian motion B = (Bt)t≥0. The prie proess
Y = (Yt)t≥0 of the endowed asset is assumed to be given by
(3.1) Yt = y0 exp
[(
α−
η2
2
)
t+ ηBt
]
,
where α and η > 0 are the onstant mean return and volatility of the non-traded asset, and y0 is
the initial prie.
Let C = (Ct)t≥0 denote the onsumption rate of the individual and let Θ = (Θt)t≥0 denote the
number of units of the endowed asset held by the investor. The onsumption rate is required to be
progressively measurable and non-negative, and the portfolio proess Θ is progressively measurable,
right-ontinuous with left limits (RCLL), non-negative and non-inreasing to reet the fat that
the non-traded asset is only allowed for sale. We assume the initial number of shares held by the
investor is θ0. Sine we allow for an initial transation at time 0 we may have Θ0 < θ0. We write
Θ0− = θ0. This is onsistent with our onvention that Θ is right-ontinuous.
We denote by X = (Xt)t≥0 the wealth proess of the individual, and suppose that the initial
wealth is x0 where x0 ≥ 0. Provided the only hanges to wealth our from either onsumption or
from the sale of the endowed asset, X evolves aording to
(3.2) dXt = −Ctdt− YtdΘt,
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subjet to X0− = x0, and X0 = x0 + y0(θ0 − Θ0). We say a onsumption/sale strategy pair is
admissible if the omponents satisfy the requirements listed above and if the resulting ash wealth
proess X is non-negative for all time. Let A (x0, y0, θ0) denote the set of admissible strategies for
initial setup (X0− = x0, Y0 = y0,Θ0− = θ0).
The objetive of the agent is to maximise over admissible strategies the disounted expeted
utility of onsumption over the innite horizon, where the disount fator is β and the utility
funtion of the agent is assumed to be CRRA with relative risk aversion R ∈ (0,∞) \ 1. In
partiular, the goal is to nd
(3.3) sup
(C,Θ)∈A(x0,y0,θ0)
E
[ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
C1−Rt
1−R
dt
]
.
Sine the set-up has a Markovian struture, we expet the value funtion, optimal onsumption
and optimal sale strategy to be funtions of the urrent wealth and endowment of the agent and
of the prie of the risky asset. Let V = V (x, y, θ, t) be the forward starting value funtion for the
problem so that
(3.4) V (x, y, θ, t) = sup
(C,Θ)∈A(x,y,θ,t)
E
[ˆ ∞
t
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
ds
∣∣∣∣Xt− = x, Yt = y,Θt− = θ] .
Here the spae of forward starting, admissible strategies A(x, y, θ, t) is suh that C = (Cs)s≥t is a
non-negative progressively measurable proess, Θ = (Θs)s≥t is a right-ontinuous, dereasing and
progressively measurable proess and satises Θt− (∆Θ)t = θ, and X given by Xs = x−
´ s
t Cudu−´
[t,s]
YudΘu is non-negative.
Dene the ertainty equivalent value (see, for example, [12℄) p = p(x, y, θ, t) of the holdings of
the risky asset to be the solution to
(3.5) V (x+ p, y, 0, t) = V (x, y, θ, t).
In fat, by the salings of the problem it will turn out that p is independent of time (and heneforth
we write p = p(x, y, θ)), and depends on the prie y of the risky asset and the quantity θ of the
holdings in the risky asset, only through the produt yθ.
Our goal is to haraterise the value funtion, the optimal onsumption and sale strategies, and
the ertainty equivalent prie p.
The key to the form of the solution to the problem is ontained in the following proposition,
whih onerns the solution of an ODE on [0, 1) and whih is proved in Appendix A. There is a
one-to-one orrespondene between the four ases in the proposition and the four types of solution
to the optimal sale problem.
Let ǫ = α/β and δ2 = η2/β.
Proposition 1. For q ∈ [0, 1] dene m(q) = 1 − ǫ (1−R) q + δ
2
2 R (1−R) q
2
and ℓ(q) = 1 +(
δ2
2 − ǫ
)
(1−R)q − δ
2
2 (1−R)
2q2 = m (q) + q (1− q) δ
2
2 (1−R). Let n = n(q) solve
(3.6) n′(q) = O(q, n(q))
where
(3.7) O(q, n) =
(1−R)
R
n
(1− q)
−
δ2
2
(1−R)2
R
qn
ℓ (q)− n
=
(1 −R)
R
n
(1− q)
m(q)− n
ℓ(q)− n
subjet to n(0) = 1 and n
′(0)
1−R <
ℓ′(0)
1−R =
δ2
2 − ǫ. Suppose that if n hits zero, then 0 is absorbing for
n. See Figure 3.1.
For R < 1, let q∗ = inf{q > 0 : n(q) ≤ m(q)}. For R > 1, let q∗ = inf{q > 0 : n(q) ≥ m(q)}.
For j ∈ {ℓ,m, n} let qj = inf{q > 0 : j(q) = 0} ∧ 1.
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Figure 3.1. Stylised plot of m(q), n(q), ℓ(q) and q∗. Parameters are hosen to
satisfy the onditions in the seond ase of Proposition 1 so that q∗ ∈ (0, 1). The
left gure is in the ase R < 1 and the right gure R > 1.
(1) Suppose ǫ ≤ 0. Then q∗ = 0.
(2) Suppose 0 < ǫ < δ2R and if R < 1, suppose in addition that ǫ < δ
2
2 R +
1
1−R . Then
0 < q∗ < 1.
(3) Suppose ǫ ≥ δ2R and if R < 1, ǫ < δ
2
2 R+
1
1−R . Then q
∗ = 1 = qℓ = qn = qm.
(4) Suppose R < 1 and ǫ > δ
2
2 R +
1
1−R . Then qm < qn = qℓ < 1. If R < 1, ǫ =
δ2
2 R +
1
1−R
and ǫ < δ2R then qm < qn = qℓ = 1. If R < 1, ǫ =
δ2
2 R +
1
1−R and ǫ ≥ δ
2R then
q∗ = 1 = qℓ = qn = qm.
Remark 2. Note that the ondition ǫ < δ2R is equivalent to (1 − R)m′(1) > 0. Further, if R < 1,
then the ondition ǫ < δ
2
2 R+
1
1−R is equivalent to m(1) > 0. Also, n has a turning point at q
∗ < 1
if and only if n(q∗) = m(q∗). See Figure 3.1. In partiular, if m is monotone (and ǫ > 0) then
q∗ = 1. Then, if R < 1, 0 < ǫ < δ2R and ǫ < δ
2
2 R +
1
1−R , we have qℓ = qn = 1.
Remark 3. It is easy to see that (1−R)n is dereasing in ǫ. In fat it an also be shown that over
parameter ranges where 0 < q∗ < 1 then q∗ is inreasing in ǫ.
Theorem 4 divides the parameter spae into the four distint regions. In partiular, it distin-
guishes the degenerate ases, and it gives neessary and suient onditions for the two dierent
regimes in the non-degenerate ase.
Theorem 4. (1) Suppose ǫ ≤ 0. Then it is always optimal to sell the entire holding of the
endowed asset immediately, so that Θt = 0 for t ≥ 0. The value funtion for the problem
is V (x, y, θ, t) = (R/β)Re−βt(x + yθ)1−R/1 − R; and the ertainty equivalent value of the
holdings of the asset is p(x, y, θ) = yθ.
(2) Suppose 0 < ǫ < δ2R and ǫ < δ
2
2 R +
1
1−R if R < 1. Then there exists a positive and nite
ritial ratio z∗ and the optimal behaviour is to sell the smallest possible quantity of the
risky asset whih is suient to keep the ratio of wealth in the risky asset to ash wealth at
or below the ritial ratio. If θ > 0 then p(x, y, θ) > yθ.
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(3) Suppose ǫ ≥ δ2R and ǫ < δ
2
2 R +
1
1−R if R < 1. Then the optimal onsumption and
sale strategy is rst to onsume liquid (ash) wealth, and then when this liquid wealth is
exhausted, to nane further onsumption from sales of the illiquid asset. If θ > 0 then
p(x, y, θ) > yθ.
(4) Suppose R < 1 and ǫ ≥ δ
2
2 R+
1
1−R . Then the problem is ill-posed, and provided θ is positive,
the value funtion V = V (x, y, θ, t) is innite. There is no unique optimal strategy, and the
ertainty equivalent value p is not dened.
Remark 5. In light of Proposition 1 there is one fewer ase for R > 1. The fourth ase in the theorem
does not happen for R > 1 sine the value funtion is always nite, as in Merton's problem.
Similarly, when R < 1, if δ2 ≥ 2/(R(1−R)) then the third ase above does not happen. In that
ase, as ǫ inreases we move diretly from ǫ < δ
2
2 R +
1
1−R and a nite value funtion and z
∗
to
ǫ ≥ δ
2
2 R+
1
1−R and an innite value funtion.
Remark 6. In their more general model with transation osts Choi et al [2℄ show that if R < 1
and ǫ ≥ δ
2R
2 +
1
1−R then the problem is ill-posed, so the nal part of the theorem is a orollary of
[2, Theorem 2.6℄
The seond and third ases above are non-degenerate and they are further haraterised in
Theorem 7 and Theorem 10. In Theorem 7 the solution is expressed in terms of a one-dimensional
autonomous reeting stohasti proess J and its loal time at zero L, see (3.14).
For 0 ≤ q ≤ q∗ dene N(q) = n(q)−R(1− q)R−1 where n is the solution to (3.6). Assuming that
N is monotoni, let W be inverse to N . Let h∗ = N(q∗). Then W (h∗) = q∗, and h∗(1 − q∗)1−R =
m(q∗)−R.
Theorem 7. i) Suppose R < 1. Suppose 0 < ǫ < δ2R and ǫ < δ
2
2 R +
1
1−R so that 0 < q
∗ < 1.
Then N as dened above is inreasing, and W is well dened.
Let z∗ be given by
(3.8) z∗ = (1 − q∗)−1 − 1 =
q∗
1− q∗
∈ (0,∞).
On [1, h∗] let h be the solution of
(3.9) u∗ − u =
ˆ h∗
h
1
(1−R)fW (f)
df,
where u∗ = ln z∗. Let g be given by
(3.10) g (z) =

(
R
β
)R
m(q∗)−R (1 + z)1−R(
R
β
)R
h (ln z)
z ∈ [z∗,∞);
z ∈ (0, z∗].
Then, the value funtion V is given by
(3.11) V (x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
x1−R
1−R
g
(
yθ
x
)
, x > 0, θ > 0
and we an extend this to x = 0 and θ = 0 by ontinuity to give
V (x, y, 0, t) = e−βt
x1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
(3.12)
V (0, y, θ, t) = e−βt
y1−Rθ1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
m(q∗)−R(3.13)
Fix z0 = y0θ0/x0. Let (J, L) = (Jt, Lt)t≥0 be the unique pair suh that
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(a) J is positive,
(b) L is inreasing, ontinuous, L0 = 0, and dLt is arried by the set {t : Jt = 0},
() J solves
(3.14) Jt = (z
∗ − z0)+ −
ˆ t
0
Λ˜(Js)ds−
ˆ t
0
Γ˜(Js)dBs + Lt,
where Λ(z) = αz + z
(
g(z)− 11−Rzg
′(z)
)−1/R
, Γ(z) = ηz, Λ˜(j) = Λ(z∗ − j) and Γ˜(j) =
Γ(z∗ − j).
For suh a pair 0 ≤ Jt ≤ z
∗
.
If z0 ≤ z
∗
then set Θ∗0 = θ0 and X
∗
0 = x0; else if z0 > z
∗
then set
Θ∗0 = θ0
z∗
(1 + z∗)
(1 + z0)
z0
and X∗0 = x0+ y0(θ0−Θ0). This orresponds to the sale of a positive quantity θ0−Θ0 of units
of the endowed asset at time 0.
Then, the optimal holdings Θ∗t of the endowed asset, the optimal onsumption proess C
∗
t =
C(X∗t , Yt,Θ
∗
t ), the resulting wealth proess and the ertainty equivalent value are given by
Θ∗t = Θ
∗
0 exp
{
−
1
z∗(1 + z∗)
Lt
}
;(3.15)
X∗t =
YtΘ
∗
t
(z∗ − Jt)
;(3.16)
C(x, y, θ) = x
[
g
(
yθ
x
)
−
1
1− R
yθ
x
g′
(
yθ
x
)]− 1
R
;(3.17)
p(x, y, θ) = x
g
(
yθ
x
)
g(0)

1
1−R
− x.(3.18)
ii) Now suppose R > 1 and 0 < ǫ < δ2R so that 0 < q∗ < 1. Let all quantities be dened as before.
Then N is dereasing. On (h∗, 1) h is dened via
u∗ − u =
ˆ h
h∗
1
(R− 1)fW (f)
df.
The value funtion, the optimal holdings Θ∗, the optimal onsumption proess C∗, the resulting
wealth proess X∗ and the ertainty equivalent value p are the same as before.
Remark 8. Reall that n solves the rst order dierential equation (3.6), and q∗ ∈ (0, 1) is the
solution of a rst rossing problem for n. One we have onstruted n and determined q∗, numeri-
ally if appropriate, expressions for all other quantities an be derived by solving a further integral
equation, whih an be re-expressed as a rst order dierential equation. This two-stage proedure
is signiantly simpler than solving the HJB equation diretly, as this equation is seond order and
non-linear, and subjet to seond-order smooth t at an unknown free boundary.
Remark 9. In the orresponding Merton problem for the unonstrained agent who may both buy
and sell the risky asset at zero transation ost, optimal behaviour for the agent is to hold a
xed proportion qM = α/η2R = ǫ/δ2R of total wealth in the risky asset. This orresponds to
keeping Qt := YtΘt/(Xt + YtΘt) equal to the onstant q
M
or equivalently Zt = YtΘt/Xt equal to
zM := qM/(1−qM ) = ǫ/(δ2R−ǫ). In Lemma 27 below we show that if ǫ > 0 then q∗ > ǫ/δ2R = qM
so that optimal behaviour for the agent who annot buy units of the risky asset is to keep the ratio
of money invested in the risky asset to ash wealth in in interval [0, q∗] where qM ∈ (0, q∗).
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The following theorem haraterises the solution to the problem in the seond non-degenerate
ase (the third ase in Theorem 4). In this ase, the optimal strategy is to rst hold the endowed
asset and nane onsumption with initial wealth. When liquid wealth is exhausted, onsumption
is further naned by the sale of endowed asset. Here, the ritial threshold z∗ =∞.
Theorem 10. Suppose ǫ ≥ δ2R and if R < 1, ǫ < δ
2
2 R+
1
1−R .
Let n solve (3.6) on [0, 1]. Then for the given parameter ombinations we have q∗ = 1. As in
Theorem 7, let N(q) = n(q)−R(1− q)R−1. Then N is monotoni.
Let W be inverse to N . For R < 1 dene γ : (1,∞) 7→ R by
(3.19) γ(v) =
ln v
1−R
+
R
1−R
lnm(1)−
1
1−R
ˆ ∞
v
(1−W (s))
sW (s)
ds.
If R > 1 dene γ : (0, 1) 7→ R by
(3.20) γ(v) = −
ln v
R− 1
−
R
R− 1
lnm(1)−
1
R− 1
ˆ v
0
(1−W (s))
sW (s)
ds.
Let h be inverse to γ and let g(z) = (R/β)Rh(ln z).
Then, the value funtion V is given by
(3.21) V (x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
x1−R
1−R
g
(
yθ
x
)
, x > 0, θ > 0
whih an be extended by ontinuity to give
V (x, y, 0, t) = e−βt
x1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
,(3.22)
V (0, y, θ, t) = e−βt
y1−Rθ1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
m(1)−R.(3.23)
The optimal onsumption proess C∗ is given by C∗t = C(X
∗
t , Yt,Θ
∗
t ) where C(x, y, θ) is as in
(3.17) and the optimal holdings Θ∗t of the endowed asset and the resulting wealth proess are given
by
(3.24) Θ∗t =
{
θ0 t ≤ τ
θ0e
− β
R
m(1)(t−τ) t > τ
, X∗t =
{
x0 −
´ t
0
C(X∗s , Ys, θ0)ds t ≤ τ
0 t > τ
,
where τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : X∗t = 0}. Finally the ertainty equivalent value is given by (3.18).
Remark 11. Note that limz↑∞ 1z (g(z) −
zg′(z)
1−R )
−1/R = βm(1)/R and hene by ontinuity we may
set C(0, y, θ) = yθβm(1)/R. Then for t > τ we have that
C∗t = C(0, Yt,Θ
∗
t ) =
β
R
m(1)YtΘ
∗
t .
4. Heuristis
The goal is to solve for the value funtion V = V (x, y, θ, t) as in (3.4). From the salings of the
problem we expet that we an write
V (x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
x1−R
1−R
g
(
yθ
x
)
where the key variable is the ratio z = yθ/x of wealth held in the risky asset to ash wealth. Note
that if θ = 0 then the problem is purely deterministi, the optimal strategy is to onsume a onstant
fration of wealth per unit time, and the value funtion is suh that g(0) = (R/β)R.
Further, we expet that the no-transation region will be a wedge 0 ≤ yθ ≤ z∗x and that for
Y0Θ0− > z∗X0− the optimal sale strategy inludes an immediate sale to bring the ratio of risky
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wealth to ash wealth below z∗. In partiular, if Y0 = y and if the initial portfolio (X0− = x,Θ0− =
θ) is suh that yθ > xz∗ then we sell φ = −(∆Θ)0 units of the risky asset where φ = θ− z
∗
1+z∗
x+yθ
y0
so that (reall Θ is right ontinuous so that Θ0+ = Θ0)
yΘ0
X0
=
y(θ − φ)
x0 + y0φ
= z∗.
This should not hange the value funtion and we onlude: for yθ > xz∗
x1−Rg
(
yθ
x
)
= (x+ yφ)1−Rg(z∗) =
(x + yθ)1−R
(1 + z∗)1−R
g(z∗),
or equivalently g(z) = (Rβ )
RA(1 + z)1−R for z > z∗ where A = ( βR )
R g(z
∗)
(1+z∗)1−R .
We expet that ˆ t
0
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
ds+ V (Xt, Yt,Θt, t)
will be a supermartingale in general and a martingale under the optimal strategy. Applying It's
formula, and optimising over Ct and Θt we nd the Hamilton-Jaobi-Bellman equation is a (seond
order, semi-linear) dierential equation for g in the no-transation region:
(4.1) 0 =
R
1−R
(
g −
zg′(z)
1−R
)1−1/R
− β
g
1−R
+ µ
zg′(z)
1−R
+
η2
2
z2g′′
1−R
z ≤ z∗.
Finally, we expet that there will be value mathing and seond-order smooth t at the free bound-
ary.
In analysing the problem our rst goal is to solve (4.1). The equation in the no-transation region
an be simplied by setting z = eu and h(u) = h(ez) = ( βR )
Rg(z). Then h(−∞) = 1, h′(−∞) = 0
and h solves a (seond-order, non-linear) autonomous equation (with no u-dependene):
0 =
(
h−
h′
1−R
)1−1/R
− h+
(
ǫ−
δ2
2
)
h′ +
δ2
2
h′′.
This equation an be simplied by setting
dh
du = w(h) so that
d2h
du2 = h
′′ = w′(h)w(h). After the
transformations we nd that w solves (5.8) below. In partiular w solves a rst-order equation,
with w(1) = 0.
Various further transformations do not redue the order of the problem, but rather simplify
the problem signiantly in appearane, and improve our ability to interpret the solution. Set
W (h) = (1−R)hw(h), N = W−1 and nally n(q) = N(q)−1/R(1− q)1−1/R. Then (at least for the
range of problems we onsider) 0 ≤ W ≤ 1, so that N and n are dened on [0, 1] and n solves the
linear rst order equation (3.6) subjet to n(0) = 1.
The advantage of swithing to n beomes apparent when we onsider the solution outside the
no-transation region. For z ≥ z∗, g(z) = (Rβ )
RA(1 + z)1−R for A to be determined. Then using
the same transformations we nd that for h ≥ h∗ = A(1 + z∗)1−R we have h(u) = ( βR )
Rg(eu) =
A(1 + eu)1−R and
w(h) =
dh
du
= (1 −R)h
eu
1 + eu
= (1−R)h
(h/A)1/(1−R) − 1
(h/A)1/(1−R)
.
It follows that for h > h∗,W (h) = 1−(A/h)1/(1−R) and for q > q˜∗ := W (h∗), N(q) = A(1−q)−(1−R)
and n(q) = A−1/R whih is a onstant.
Seond order smooth t of g orresponds to rst order smooth t of w (andW , N and n). Hene
we are looking for a solution n and free boundary q∗ suh that n ∈ C1 and n′ = 0 at q = q˜∗.
However, the plaes in (q, n) spae where n′ = 0 are exatly the points on the urve (q,m(q)) where
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m is the quadrati funtion of q given in the statement of Proposition 1. Hene the free boundary
problem beomes a rst rossing problem for n, and q˜∗ = q∗, the rst rossing point by n of m.
Suppose 0 < R < 1. (The analysis for R > 1 is similar, but sometimes the inequalities and
monotoniities are reversed.) It is lear from the form of the dierential equation for n that if
n(qˆ) ∈ (0, ℓ(qˆ)) for some qˆ ∈ (0, 1) then n(q) < ℓ(q) on [qˆ, 1 ∧ qℓ), where qℓ is the rst time that ℓ
hits zero. Further, n is dereasing at q if n(q) ∈ (m(q), ℓ(q)). By the above arguments A = n(q∗)−R
and by onstrution
q∗ = W (h∗) =
w(h∗)
(1−R)h∗
= 1−
(
A
h∗
)1/(1−R)
= 1−
1
(1 + z∗)
.
In partiular, we an read o the limits of the no-transation region and the value funtion outside
the no-transation region diretly from the solution of the rst rossing problem for n; z∗ = q
∗
1−q∗
and g(z) = (Rβ )
Rn(q∗)−R(1 + z)1−R for z ≥ z∗. This simplies many of the omparative statis
for the problem signiantly. Finally, given h∗ and q∗ we an solve for h and hene g and V via
w(h) = dhdu or equivalently (3.9).
4.1. Relationship with Choi et al. In a reent paper, Choi et al [2℄ onsider the nite transation
ost version of the problem we disuss here. Their results an be speialized to our problem.
Conversely our approah as desribed above extends to the ase of transation osts; the main
hange is that instead of solving a rst order equation for n started at n(0) = 1 we need to nd a
solution for n whih starts and ends on the urve (q,m(q)). One unimportant distintion between
this paper and [2℄ is that we insist that X ≥ 0 whereas Choi et al work in the solveny region
whereby agents are allowed negative ash wealth, provided any borrownings an be overed by the
sale of the risky asset, net of any transation osts. In our ase the stronger requirement X ≥ 0 is
not unnatural, and does have the advantage of simplifying the analysis, in that some of the singular
ases disussed in [2℄ do not our. Instead we have the results in Theorem 10.
In their more ompliated problem with an extra parameter orresponding to the round-trip
transation ost, Choi et al [2℄ onentrate on deriving the form of the value funtion, and delimiting
the various parameter regimes under whih the solution takes dierent forms. They nd some very
interesting results onerning how the solution hanges within the dierent regimes. In our simpler
problem when the risky asset an be sold but not bought, we prove a similar set of results. The
innovation in our paper is that we disuss in detail the omparative statis.
The solution approah in Choi et al is dierent to that proposed here in that the approah is
via the dual problem and shadow pries. In ontrast our approah is lassial and is based on
onsideration of the HJB equation for the value funtion. In priniple, the two formulations should
be equivalent, and one is a re-parametrisation of the other, and one or other approah in a given
appliation may lead to a more diret solution or an easier veriation. But, our belief is that our
nal problem, as expressed as a rst rossing problem for the solution of a rst order dierential
equation is simpler, at least in appearane, than that in [2℄, and this remains the ase, both when
our approah is extended to nite transation osts, and when their method is speialised to allow
sales but not purhases. (It may be the ase that the soure of this apparent simpliation is the
extra eort we expend after the order redution i.e. after hanging the dependent variable from u
to h. In partiular, the transformation from w to n leads to an equation whih is muh simpler to
interpret. Choi et al [2℄ make a similar order reduing transformation, but then proeed diretly
from the resulting equation.)
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Choi et al [2, Setion 5℄ redue the problem
1
to solving
s′(p) =
P (p, s)
Q(p, s)
where P is a polynomial in s and p whih is quadrati in both p and s and Q is a polynomial whih
is quadrati in p and linear in s. In Choi et al's method the andidate loations of the smooth-t
points are the solutions to P (p, s) = 0 whih are points on an ellipse, or on a hyperbola. In ontrast,
in our formulation the andidate loations of the smooth t points lie on the quadrati m. Further,
in our formulation, and as desribed above, the value funtion outside the no-transation region
and the loation of the free boundary an be inferred diretly from the solution of the rst rossing
problem for n. Finally, we note that in a losing remark Choi et al [2, Remark 6.15℄ state that
they are unable to give a diret argument for the monotoniity of one of the important quantities
of interest. In our speiation, this monotoniity is easy to prove.
5. Proofs and verifiation arguments
For F = F (x, y, θ, t) ∈ C1,2,1,1 suh that Fx > 0 dene operators L and M by
LF = sup
c>0
{
e−βt
c1−R
1−R
− cFx
}
+ αyFy + Ft +
1
2
η2y2Fyy
=
R
1−R
e−
β
R
tF 1−1/Rx + αyFy + Ft +
1
2
η2y2Fyy,
MF = Fθ − yFx.
Remark 12. The state spae of (Xt, Yt,Θt, t) is [0,∞)× (0,∞) × [0,∞) × [0,∞), and we want to
dene L and M on this region inluding at the boundary. In pratie, all the funtions to whih
we apply the operators are of the form F (x, y, θ, t) = e−βtF (x, y, θ) for some funtion F whih is
independent of t in whih ase Ft = −βF , and this latter form is well dened at t = 0. Also, we
typially need MF only for θ > 0. Then, given F dened for x > 0 we an dene F at x = 0 by
ontinuity, and then MF |x=0 is also well dened. LF at θ = 0 an be dened similarly, by rst
dening F at θ = 0 by ontinuity. In order to dene LF at x = 0 for θ > 0 we extend the domain
of F to x > −θy and then show that Fx and the other derivatives of F are ontinuous aross x = 0
with this extension.
5.1. The Veriation Lemma in the ase of a depreiating asset. Suppose ǫ ≤ 0. Our goal
is to show that the onlusions of Theorem 4(1) hold.
From Proposition 1 we know q∗ = 0. Dene the andidate value funtion via
(5.1) G(x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
(
R
β
)R
(x + yθ)1−R
1−R
x ≥ 0, θ ≥ 0.
The andidate optimal strategy is to sell all units of the risky asset immediately. The domain of G
an be extended to −θy < x < 0 for θ > 0, using the same funtional form as in (5.1).
Prior to the proof of the theorem, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 13. Suppose ǫ ≤ 0. Consider the andidate value funtion onstruted in (5.1). Then on
(x ≥ 0, θ > 0) we have MG = 0, and on (x ≥ 0, θ ≥ 0) we have LG ≤ 0 with equality at θ = 0.
1
The methodologies of Kallsen and Muhle-Karbe [16℄, Herzegh and Prokaj [11℄ and Choi et al [2℄ all lead to a
dierential equation whih must be solved. In [16, Equation (3.13)℄ this is expressed as a semi-linear seond order
equation f ′′ = LKM (f, f
′) where LKM is a polynomial of third order in f
′
with o-eients whih are ratios of linear
funtions of ef . In [11, Equation (55)℄ the problem is redued to a rst order dierential equation f ′ = LHP (x, f)
where LHP is ubi in f with o-eients whih are rational funtions of x.
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Proof. Given the form of the andidate value funtion in (5.1), we have
MG = e−βt
(
R
β
)R
y(x+ yθ)−R − e−βt
(
R
β
)R
y(x+ yθ)−R = 0.
On the other hand, writing z = yθ/x, provided x > 0
LG = β
(
R
β
)R
e−βt
(x+ yθ)1−R
1−R
[
ǫ(1−R)
z
1 + z
−
1
2
δ2R(1−R)
(
z
1 + z
)2]
≤ 0,
with equality at z = 0. If x = 0 then LG = βG(1 −R)[ǫ− δ
2R
2 ] < 0. 
Theorem 14. Suppose ǫ ≤ 0. Then the value funtion is
(5.2) V (x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
(
R
β
)R
(x + yθ)1−R
1−R
,
and the optimal holdings Θ∗t of the endowed asset, the optimal onsumption proess C
∗
t and the
resulting wealth proess are given by
(5.3) (△Θ∗)t=0 = −θ0, C∗t =
β
R
(x0 + y0θ0)e
− β
R
t, X∗t = (x0 + y0θ0)e
− β
R
t.
Proof. Note that andidate optimal strategy given in (5.3) is to sell the entire holding of the risky
asset at time zero (whih gives X∗0 = x0 + y0θ0) and thereafter to nane onsumption from liquid
wealth, whene the wealth proess (X∗t )t≥0 is deterministi and evolves as dX
∗
t = −C
∗
t dt. This
gives X∗t = (x0 + y0θ0)e
− β
R
t
. It follows that the andidate optimal strategy is admissible.
The value funtion under the strategy proposed in (5.3) is
E
[ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
C∗t
1−R
1−R
dt
]
=
ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
(
β
R
)1−R (e− βR t(x0 + y0θ0))1−R
1−R
dt
=
(
R
β
)R
(x0 + y0θ0)
1−R
1−R
= G(x0, y0, θ0, 0).
Hene V ≥ G.
Now, onsider general admissible strategies. Suppose rst that R < 1. Dene the proess
M = (Mt)t≥0 by
(5.4) Mt =
ˆ t
0
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
ds+G (Xt, Yt,Θt, t) .
Applying the generalised It's formula [9, Setion 4.7℄ toMt and suppressing the argument (Xs−, Ys,Θs−, s)
in derivatives of G, leads to
Mt −M0 =
ˆ t
0
[
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
− CsGx + αYsGy +
1
2
η2Y 2s Gyy +Gs
]
ds
+
ˆ t
0
(Gθ − YsGx)dΘs
+
∑
0≤s≤t
[G(Xs, Ys,Θs, s)−G(Xs−, Ys−,Θs−, s)−Gx(△X)s −Gθ(△Θ)s](5.5)
+
ˆ t
0
ηYsGydBs
= N1t +N
2
t +N
3
t +N
4
t .
(Note that in the sum we allow for a portfolio rebalaning at s = 0.)
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Lemma 13 implies that LG ≤ 0 and MG = 0, whih leads to N1t ≤ 0 and N
2
t = 0. Using the
fat that (∆X)s = −Ys(∆Θ)s and writing θ = Θs−, x = Xs−, χ = −(∆Θ)s eah non-zero jump in
N3 is of the form
(∆N3)s = G(x + yχ, y, θ − χ, s)−G(x, y, θ, s) + χ [Gθ(x, y, θ, s)− yGx(x, y, θ, s)] .
Given the form of the andidate value funtion in (5.1), it is easy to see that ψ(φ) = G(x+yφ, y, θ−
φ, s) is onstant in φ, whih gives ψ(χ) = ψ(0) and yGx = Gθ whene (∆N
3) = 0. Then, sine
R < 1, we have 0 ≤Mt ≤M0+N
4
t , and the loal martingale N
4
t is bounded from below and hene
a supermartingale. Taking expetations we nd E(Mt) ≤M0 = G(x0, y0, θ0, 0), whih gives
(5.6) G(x0, y0, θ0, 0) ≥ E
ˆ t
0
e−βs
Cs
1−R
1−R
ds+ EG(Xt, Yt,Θt, t) ≥ E
ˆ t
0
e−βs
Cs
1−R
1−R
ds,
where the last inequality follows sine G(Xt, Yt,Θt, t) ≥ 0 for R ∈ (0, 1). Letting t → ∞ in (5.6)
leads to
G(x0, y0, θ0, 0) ≥ E
ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
Ct
1−R
1−R
dt,
and taking a supremum over admissible strategies leads to G ≥ V .
The ase R > 1 is onsidered in the Appendix C.

5.2. Proof in the ill-posed ase of Theorem 4. Reall we are in the ase where R < 1 and
ǫ ≥ δ2R/2 + 1/(1−R).
It is suient to give an example of an admissible strategy when θ > 0 for whih the expeted
utility of onsumption is innite. Note that V (x, y, 0, t) = e−βtx1−RRRβ−R/(1 − R) so that the
value funtion is not ontinuous at θ = 0.
Consider a onsumption and sale strategy pair ((C˜)t≥0, (Θ˜)t≥0), given by
(5.7)
Θ˜t = Θ˜t(φ) = e
−φtθ0, C˜t = C˜t(φ) = φYtΘ˜t = φy0θ0 exp
{
β(ǫ − δ2/2− φ/β)t+ δ
√
βBt
}
,
where φ is some positive onstant.
Note rst that that suh strategies are admissible sine the orresponding wealth proess satises
dX˜t = −φYtΘ˜tdt+ YtdΘ˜t = 0, and hene (X˜t)t≥0 = x0 > 0. In partiular, onsumption is naned
by the sale of the endowed asset only.
The expeted disounted utility from onsumption G˜ = G˜(φ) orresponding to the onsumption
and sale proesses (C˜, Θ˜) is given by
G˜ = E
[ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
C˜1−Rt
1−R
dt
]
=
(φy0θ0)
1−R
1−R
E
[ˆ ∞
0
exp
{
β
[
(1−R)
(
ǫ−
δ2
2
−
φ
β
)
− 1
]
t+ (1−R)δ
√
βBt
}
dt
]
=
(φy0θ0)
1−R
1−R
ˆ ∞
0
exp
{
β(1 −R)
[(
ǫ−
δ2R
2
−
1
1−R
)
−
φ
β
]
t
}
dt
Suppose rst that ǫ > δ2R/2+1/(1−R). Then for λ ∈ (0, 1) and φ = λβ(ǫ− δ2R/2−1/(1−R))
we have (
ǫ−
δ2R
2
−
1
1−R
)
−
φ
β
= (1− λ)
(
ǫ−
δ2R
2
−
1
1−R
)
> 0,
and G˜ is innite.
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Now suppose that ǫ = δ2R/2 + 1/(1−R). Then
G˜(φ) =
(φy0θ0)
1−R
(1−R)
1
φ(1 −R)
= φ−R
(y0θ0)
1−R
(1−R)2
and G˜(φ) ↑ ∞ as φ ↓ 0.
5.3. The Veriation Lemma in the rst non-degenerate ase with nite ritial exerise
ratio. Suppose 0 < ǫ < δ2R and if R < 1, ǫ < δ
2
2 R+
1
1−R . From Proposition 1 we know 0 < q
∗ < 1.
Reall the denition N(q) = n(q)−R(1−q)R−1 and thatW is inverse to N . We have h∗ = N(q∗).
Proposition 15. (1) For R < 1, N is inreasing on [0, q∗]. W is inreasing and 0 < W (v) <
q∗ on (1, h∗). For R > 1, N is dereasing on [0, q∗]. W is dereasing and 0 < W (v) < q∗
on (h∗, 1).
(2) Let w(v) = v(1 −R)W (v). Then w solves
(5.8)
δ2
2
w(v)w′(v) − v +
(
ǫ−
δ2
2
)
w(v) +
(
v −
w(v)
1−R
)1−1/R
= 0.
(3) For R < 1 and 1 < v < h∗, and for R > 1 and h∗ < v < 1 we have w′(v) < 1−Rw(v)/((1−
R)v) with w′(h∗) = 1−Rw(h∗)/((1−R)h∗).
The proof of Proposition 15 is given in the appendix.
Now dene h on [1, h∗) by dhdu = w(h) = (1 − R)hW (h) subjet to h(u
∗) = h∗. Then h solves
(3.9) and w′(h)w(h) = d
2h
du2 . Let g(z) = (
R
β )
Rh(ln z). Then g solves (3.10).
Lemma 16. Let m(q∗)−R, z∗ and g be as given in Equations (3.8) and (3.10) of Theorem 7. Then,
g (z), g′ (z), g′′ (z) are ontinuous at z = z∗.
Proof. We have
g(z∗+) =
(
R
β
)R
h∗(1 − q∗)1−R (1 + z∗)1−R =
(
R
β
)R
h∗ =
(
R
β
)R
h(u∗) = g(z∗−).
For the rst derivative we have for z > z∗,
zg′(z) = (1 −R)
(
zg(z)
1 + z
)
and then sine
z∗
1+z∗ = q
∗
, z∗g′(z∗) = (1 − R)
(
R
β
)R
h∗q∗. Meanwhile, for z < z∗, and noting that
dh
du = h(1 −R)W (h) = w(h),
zg′(z) =
(
R
β
)R
h′(u) =
(
R
β
)R
w(h)
so that z∗g′(z∗−) =
(
R
β
)R
w(h∗) and the result follows from the substitution w(h∗) = (1 −
R)h∗W (h∗) = (1−R)h∗q∗.
Finally, for z > z∗
(5.9) z2g′′(z) = −R(1−R)
(
R
β
)R
m(q∗)−R(1 + z)1−R
(
z
1 + z
)2
= −R(1−R)g(z)
(
z
1 + z
)2
and (z∗)2g′′(z∗+) = −R(1−R)g(z∗)(q∗)2. For z < z∗,
(5.10) z2g′′(z) =
(
R
β
)R
(h′′ − h′) =
(
R
β
)R
(w′(h)− 1)w(h)
and at z∗, (z∗)2g′′(z∗−) = −R(1−R)
(
R
β
)R
h∗(q∗)2 where we use Proposition 15 (3). 
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Proposition 17. Suppose g (z) solves (3.10). Then for R < 1, g is an inreasing onave funtion
suh that g(0) = (Rβ )
R
. Otherwise, for R > 1, g is a dereasing onvex funtion suh that g(0) =
(R/β)R and g(z) ≥ 0. Further, for all values of R we have that 0 ≥ Rg′(z)2 + (1 − R)g(z)g′′(z)
with equality for z ≥ z∗.
Proof. Consider rst R < 1. Sine the statements are immediate in the region z ≥ z∗, and sine
there is seond order smooth t at z∗ the result will follow if h(−∞) = 1, h is inreasing and, using
(5.10), w(h)w′(h) − w(h) ≤ 0. The last two properties follow from Proposition 15 sine w(h) ≥ 0
and w′(h) < 1.
To evaluate h(−∞) note that
u∗ − u =
ˆ h∗
h(u)
df
(1−R)fW (f)
=
ˆ q∗
W (h(u))
N ′(q)
(1−R)N(q)q
dq =
ˆ q∗
W (h(u))
δ2
2 (1−R)
ℓ(q)− n(q)
dq.
We have that ℓ(q)− n(q) is bounded away from zero when q is bounded away from zero. Further,
near q = 0 we have ℓ(q) − n(q) ∼ Cq for some positive onstant C = ℓ′(0) − n′(0+). Hene
W (h(−∞)) = 0 and h(−∞) = 1, sine W (1) = 0.
For R > 1, and z ≥ z∗, the statement holds immediately. For z ≤ z∗, Proposition 15 implies
that h is dereasing and w(h) ≤ 0, w′(h) < 1. Together with (5.10), we have g is a dereasing
onvex funtion and g(z) ≥ 0 given that h ∈ [0, 1].
For the nal statement of the proposition, for z ≥ z∗ the result follows immediately, whereas for
z < z∗
(1−R)gg′′z2 +R(zg′)2 =
(
R
β
)2R [
(1−R)hw(h)[w′(h)− 1] +Rw(h)2
]
≤ 0
where the nal inequality follows from Proposition 15(3), noting that (1−R)w(h) ≥ 0.

Dene the andidate value funtion via
(5.11) G(x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
x1−R
1−R
g
(
yθ
x
)
x > 0, θ > 0;
and extend to x ≤ 0 and θ = 0 using the formulae
G(x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
(x+ yθ)1−R
1−R
m(q∗)−R − θy < x ≤ 0, θ > 0;(5.12)
G(x, y, 0, t) = e−βt
x1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
x ≥ 0, θ = 0.(5.13)
Lemma 18. Fix y and t. Then G = G(x, θ) is onave in x and θ on [0,∞)× [0,∞). In partiular,
if ψ(χ) = G(x− χyφ, y, θ + χφ, t), then ψ is onave in χ.
Proof. Consider rst R < 1. In order to show the onavity of the andidate value funtion it is
suient to show that G(x, 0) is onave in x, G(0, θ) is onave in θ and that the Hessian matrix
given by
HG =
(
Gxx Gxθ
Gxθ Gθθ
)
.
has a positive determinant, and that one of the diagonal entries is non-positive. The onditions on
G(x, 0) and G(0, θ) are trivial to verify.
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Diret omputation leads to
Gxx (x, y, θ, y) = e
−βtx−R−1
[
−Rg (z) +
2R
1−R
zg′ (z) +
1
1−R
z2g′′ (z)
]
,
Gxθ (x, y, θ, t) = −e
−βtx−R−1
y
1−R
[Rg′ (z) + zg′′ (z)] ,
Gθθ (x, y, θ, t) = e
−βtx−R−1
y2
1−R
g′′ (z) ,
and the determinant of the Hessian matrix is
(5.14) GxxGθθ − (Gxθ)
2
= −e−2βtx−2Rθ−2
R
(1−R)2
[
(1−R)g (z) z2g′′ (z) +R (zg′ (z))2
]
whih is non-negative by Proposition 17. Further, sine g is onave we have that Gθθ ≤ 0.
In order to show the onavity of ψ in χ, it is equivalent to examine the sign of d
2ψ
dχ2 . But
d2ψ
dχ2
= φ2
[
y2Gxx +Gθθ − 2yGxθ
]
= φ2(y, 1) det(HG)(y, 1)
T ≤ 0.
For R > 1 the argument is similar, exept that Gθθ ≤ 0 is now implied by the onvexity of g. 
Lemma 19. Consider the andidate value funtion onstruted in (5.11).
(a) For θ > 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ yθ/z∗, MG = 0 and LG ≤ 0.
(b) For θ > 0 and x ≥ yθ/z∗, MG ≥ 0. For θ ≥ 0 and x ≥ yθ/z∗, LG = 0.
Proof. (a) For z ≥ z∗, MG = 0 is immediate from the denition of G. For 0 < x ≤ yθ/z∗ LG we
have that G(x, y, θ, t) =
(
R
β
)R
m(q∗)−Re−βt x
1−R
1−R (1 + z)
1−R
and then
LG = βG
[
m(q∗)− 1 + ǫ (1−R)
z
1 + z
−
1
2
δ2R (1−R)
z2
(1 + z)2
]
,
= βG
[
m(q∗)−m
(
z
1 + z
)]
.
The required inequality follows from Part (5) of Lemma 27 in Appendix A and the fat that
m(q)/(1 − R) is inreasing on (q∗, 1). At x = 0 using both (5.11) and (5.12) we have LG|x=0+ =
LG|x=0−βG[m(q∗)−m(1)] < 0.
(b) In order to prove LG = 0 for θ > 0 we alulate
LG(x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
x1−R
1−R
[
R
(
g −
zg′(z)
1 −R
)1−1/R
− βg + αzg′(z) +
η2
2
z2g′′(z)
]
= βe−βt
x1−R
1−R
[
h1−1/R
(
1−
w(h)
(1−R)h
)
− h+
(
ǫ−
δ2
2
)
w(h) +
δ2
2
w′(h)w(h)
]
and the result follows from Proposition 15. For θ = 0, LG = 0 is a simple alulation.
Now onsider MG. We have
(5.15) MG = e−βtx−Ry
[
(1 + z)
1−R
g′ (z)− g (z)
]
.
Hene for R < 1, it is suient to show that ψ(z) ≥ 0 on (0, z∗] where
ψ (z) =
1 + z
1−R
−
g (z)
g′ (z)
.
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By value mathing and smooth t g(z∗) = m(q∗)−R (1 + z∗)1−R and z∗g′(z∗) = m(q∗)−R(1 −
R) (1 + z∗)−R. Hene ψ(z∗) = 0 and it is suient to show that ψ is dereasing. But
ψ′ (z) =
R
1−R
+
g (z) g′′ (z)
g′ (z)2
=
R
1−R
+
h [w (h)w′ (h)− w (h)]
w (h)
2
≤ 0(5.16)
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 15. Similarly, for R > 1, provided that g is
dereasing by Proposition 17, it is suient to show that ψ is inreasing. But Proposition 15 gives
ψ′ (z) =
R
1−R
+
g (z) g′′ (z)
g′ (z)2
=
R
1−R
+
h [w (h)w′ (h)− w (h)]
w (h)2
≥ 0.

Proposition 20. Let X∗, Θ∗ and C∗ be as dened in Theorem 7. Then they orrespond to an
admissible wealth proess. Moreover Z∗t = YtΘ
∗/X∗t satises 0 ≤ Z
∗
t ≤ z
∗
.
Proof. Note that if y0θ0/x0 > z
∗
then the optimal strategy inludes a sale of the endowed asset
at time zero, and the eet of the sale is to move to new state variables (X∗0 , y0,Θ
∗
0, 0) with the
property that Z∗0 = y0Θ
∗
0/X
∗
0 = z
∗
.
Reall the denitions of Λ˜ and Γ˜ and set Σ(z) = z(1 + z) and Σ˜(j) = Σ(z∗ − j).
Consider the equation
(5.17) Jˆt = Jˆ0 −
ˆ t
0
Λ˜
(
Jˆs
)
ds−
ˆ t
0
Γ˜
(
Jˆs
)
dBs + Lˆt
with initial ondition Jˆ0 = (z
∗ − z0)+. This equation is assoiated with a stohasti dierential
equation with reetion (Revuz and Yor [22, p385℄) and has a unique solution (J, L) for whih (J, L)
is adapted, J ≥ 0, L0 = 0 and L only inreases when J is zero.
Note that Λ˜(z∗) = Λ(0) = 0 = Γ(0) = Γ˜(z∗) and hene J is bounded above by z∗.
Reall that Θ∗t = Θ
∗
0 exp(−Lt/Σ˜(0)). Then Θ
∗
t is adapted, ontinuous and hene progressively
measurable (Karatzas and Shreve [17, p5℄). Θ∗t is also dereasing and dΘ
∗
t = −Θ
∗
tdLt/Σ˜(0) =
−Θ∗tdLt/Σ˜(Jt) sine L only grows when J = 0.
Then let Z∗t = z
∗− Jt, X∗t = Θ
∗
tYt/Z
∗
t and C
∗
t = X
∗
t (g(Z
∗
t )−Z
∗
t g
′(Z∗t )/(1−R))
−1/R
. Then X∗
and C∗ are positive and progressively measurable. It remains to show that X is the wealth proess
arising from the onsumption and sale strategy (C∗,Θ∗). But, from (5.17) and using, for example
Λ˜(Jt) = Λ(Z
∗
t ),
dZ∗t = Λ (Z
∗
t ) dt+ Γ (Z
∗
t ) dBt +Σ(Z
∗
t )
dΘ∗t
Θ∗t
.
and then
dX∗t =
Θ∗tYt
Z∗t
[
dΘ∗t
Θ∗t
+
dYt
Yt
−
dZ∗t
Z∗t
+
(
dZ∗t
Z∗t
)2
−
dYt
Yt
dZ∗t
Z∗t
]
= X∗t
[(
η −
Γ(Z∗t )
Z∗t
)
dBt +
(
α−
Λ(Z∗t )
Z∗t
+
Γ(Z∗t )
2
(Z∗t )2
− η
Γ(Z∗t )
Z∗t
)
dt
]
+
(
Yt
Z∗t
−
Yt
Z∗t
Σ(Z∗t )
Z∗t
)
dΘ∗t
= −C∗t dt− YtdΘ
∗
t
as required, where we use the denitions of Λ, Γ and Σ for the nal equality. 
Proof of Theorem 7. First we show that there is a strategy suh that the andidate value funtion
is attained, and hene that V ≥ G.
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Observe rst that if y0θ0/x0 > z
∗
then
θ0 −Θ
∗
0 = θ0
(
1−
z∗
1 + z∗
1 + z0
z0
)
and
X∗0 = x0 + y0(θ0 −Θ
∗
0) = x0
(1 + z0)
(1 + z∗)
Then, sine g(z∗)/g(z0) = (1 + z∗)1−R/(1 + z0)1−R for z0 > z∗,
G(X∗0 , y0,Θ
∗
0, 0) =
(X∗0 )
1−R
1−R
g(z∗) =
x1−R0
1−R
g(z0) = G(x0, y0, θ0, 0).
For a general admissible strategy dene the proess M = (Mt)t≥0 by
(5.18) Mt =
ˆ t
0
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
ds+G (Xt, Yt,Θt, t) .
WriteM∗ for the orresponding proess under the proposed optimal strategy. ThenM∗0 = G(X
∗
0 , y0,Θ
∗
0, 0) =
G(x0, y0, θ0, 0) so there is no jump of M
∗
at t = 0. Further, although the optimal strategy may
inlude the sale of a positive quantity of the risky asset at time zero, it follows from Proposition 20
that thereafter the proess Θ∗ is ontinuous and suh that Z∗t = YtΘ
∗
t/X
∗
t ≤ z
∗
.
From the form of the andidate value funtion and the denition of g given in (3.10), we know
that G is C1,2,1,1. Then applying It's formula to Mt, using the ontinuity of X
∗
and Θ∗ for t > 0,
and writing G· as shorthand for G·(X∗s , Ys,Θ
∗
s, s) we have
M∗t −M0 =
ˆ t
0
[
e−βs
(C∗s )
1−R
1−R
− C∗sGx + αYsGy +
1
2
η2Y 2s Gyy +Gt
]
ds
+
ˆ
(0,t]
(Gθ − YsGx) dΘ
∗
s(5.19)
+
ˆ t
0
ηYsGydBs
=: N1t +N
2
t +N
3
t
Sine Z∗t ≤ z
∗
, and sine C∗t = e
−βs/RG−1/Rx and LG = 0 for z ≤ z∗ we have N1t = 0. Further,
dΘs 6= 0 if and only if Z
∗
t = z
∗
and then MG = 0, so that N2t = 0.
To omplete the proof of the theorem we need the following lemma whih is proved in Appendix B.
Lemma 21. (1) N3 given by N3t =
´ t
0 ηYsGy(X
∗
s , Ys,Θ
∗
s, s)dBs is a martingale.
(2) limt↑∞ E[G(X∗t , Yt,Θ
∗
t , t)] = 0.
Returning to the proof of the theorem, and taking expetations on both sides of (5.19), we have
E [M∗t ] = M0, whih leads to
G (x0, y0, θ0, 0) = E
(ˆ t
0
e−βs
(C∗s )
∗1−R
1−R
ds
)
+ E [G (X∗t , y,Θ
∗
t , t)] .
Using the seond part of Lemma 21 and applying the monotone onvergene theorem, we have
G (x0, y0, θ0, 0) = E
(ˆ ∞
0
e−βs
C∗1−Rs
1−R
ds
)
and hene V ≥ G.
Now we onsider general admissible strategies. Applying the generalised It's formula [9, Setion
4.7℄ toMt leads to the same expression as in (5.5). Lemma 19 implies that under general admissible
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strategies, N1t ≤ 0, N
2
t ≤ 0. Consider the jump term,
(5.20) N3t =
∑
0≤s≤t
[G (Xs, Ys,Θs, s)−G (Xs−, Ys,Θs−, s)−Gx(∆X)s −Gθ(∆Θ)s]
Using the fat that (∆X)s = −Ys(∆Θ)s and writing θ = Θs−, x = Xs−, χ = −(∆Θ)s eah non-zero
jump in N3 is of the form
(∆N3)s = G(x + yχ, y, θ − χ, s)−G(x, y, θ, s) + χ [Gθ(x, y, θ, s)− yGx(x, y, θ, s)] .
But, by Lemma 18, G(x + yχ, y, θ − χ, s) is onave in χ and hene (∆N3) ≤ 0.
For R < 1 the rest of the proof is exatly as in Theorem 14. The ase of R > 1 is overed in
Appendix C.

5.4. The Veriation Lemma in the seond non-degenerate ase with no nite ritial
exerise ratio. Throughout this setion we suppose that ǫ ≥ δ2R and that if R < 1 then 0 < ǫ <
δ2
2 R+
1
1−R . It follows that q
∗ = 1 and z∗ =∞, and that n(1) = m(1) > 0.
Reall the denition of n in (3.6) and the subsequent denitions ofN byN(q) = n(q)−R(1−q)R−1
and W = N−1. Suppose R < 1 and dene γ as in (3.19) by
γ(v) =
1
1−R
ln v +
R
1−R
lnm(1)−
1
1−R
ˆ ∞
v
1−W (s)
sW (s)
ds.
In the ase R > 1 dene γ via (3.20) so that
γ(v) = −
1
R− 1
ln v −
R
R− 1
lnm(1)−
1
R− 1
ˆ v
0
1−W (s)
sW (s)
ds.
For all R dene also γ˜ by
γ˜(v) =
ln v
1−R
− γ(v).
Let h be inverse to γ and set g(z) = (R/β)Rh(ln z).
Lemma 22. (1) Suppose R < 1. Then γ : (1,∞) 7→ (−∞,∞) is well dened, inreasing,
ontinuous and onto. Furthermore,
lim
v↑∞
γ˜(v) =
−R
1−R
lnm(1) and lim
v↑∞
(1−W (v))eγ(v) = 1.
Suppose R > 1. Then γ : (0, 1) 7→ (−∞,∞) is well dened, dereasing, ontinuous and
onto. Furthermore,
lim
v↓0
γ˜(v) =
R
R− 1
lnm(1) and lim
v↓0
(1−W (v))eγ(v) = 1.
(2) h solves h′ = (1−R)hW (h), and h(−∞) = 1.
Proof. Suppose R < 1, the proof for R > 1 being similar. First we want to show thatˆ ∞ 1−W (s)
sW (s)
ds <∞, and
ˆ
1+
1−W (s)
sW (s)
ds =∞,
whih, given lims↑∞W (s) = 1 and lims↓1W (s) = 0 is equivalent toˆ ∞ 1−W (s)
s
ds <∞;
ˆ
1+
1
W (s)
ds =∞.
But (1 − q)N(q)1/(1−R)
q↑1
−→ n(1)−R/(1−R) and so (1 −W (s)) ∼ n(1)−R/(1−R)s−1/(1−R) for large
s and the rst integral is nite. Conversely, sine N ′(0+) = κ for some κ ∈ (0,∞) we have
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W ′(1+) = κ−1 and W (s) ∼ (s − 1)κ−1 for s near 1. Sine 1/(s − 1) is not integrable near 1, the
seond integral explodes.
It follows that γ is onto; the fat that γ is inreasing follows on dierentiation. Indeed γ′(v) =
1/((1−R)vW (v)) and hene h′ = (1− R)hW (h). Also h(−∞) := limu↓−∞ h(u) = 1.
The rst limit result for γ˜ follows immediately from the denition. For the seond,
lim
v↑∞
eγ(v)(1−W (v)) = lim
v↑∞
e−γ˜(v)v1/(1−R)(1−W (v)) = lim
v↑∞
e−γ˜(v) lim
q↑1
N(q)1/(1−R)(1 − q)
= m(1)R/(1−R) lim
q↑1
n(q)−R/(1−R) = 1.

Dene the andidate value funtion via
(5.21) G(x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
x1−R
1−R
g
(
yθ
x
)
, x > 0, θ > 0
and extend the denition to θ = 0 and −θy < x ≤ 0 by
G(x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
(x + yθ)1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
m(1)−R − θy < x ≤ 0, θ > 0;(5.22)
G(x, y, 0, t) = e−βt
x1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
x ≥ 0, θ = 0.(5.23)
Here ontinuity of G at x = 0 follows from the identity
(5.24) lim
z↑∞
zR−1g(z) = lim
u↑∞
e−(1−R)uh(u) = lim
v
e−(1−R)γ(v)v = lim
v
e−(1−R)γ˜(v) = m(1)−R.
Lemma 23. Fix y and t. Then G = G(x, θ) is onave in x and θ on [0,∞)× [0,∞). In partiular,
if ψ(χ) = G(x− χy, y, θ + χ, t), then ψ is onave in χ.
Proof. The proof follows similarly to the proof of Lemma 18, and makes use of the fat dh/du =
(1−R)hW (h) proved in Lemma 22. 
Lemma 24. Consider the andidate funtion onstruted in (5.21)(5.23). Then for x > 0, θ > 0,
LG = 0, and MG ≥ 0. Further, MG = 0 at (x = 0, θ > 0) and LG = 0 at x = 0 and at θ = 0.
Proof. The majority of the lemma follows exatly as in Lemma 19.
For MG|x=0, note that Gθ|x=0 = yG(1 − R)/(x + yθ)|x=0 = (1 − R)G/θ. Then, yGx|x=0− =
yG(1−R)/(x+ yθ)|x=0− = (1−R)G/θ, whereas for x > 0,
yGx =
y(1−R)G
x
−
g′
g
y2θ
x2
G =
(1−R)G
θ
[
z −
z2g′(z)
(1−R)g(z)
]
,
and then for xed (y, θ)
lim
x↓0
[
z −
z2g′(z)
(1−R)g(z)
]
= lim
u↑∞
eu
(
1−
h′(u)
(1−R)h(u)
)
= lim
v
eγ(v) (1−W (v)) = 1.

Proof of Theorem 10. For an admissible strategy (C,Θ) = (Ct,Θt)t≥0 dene the proessM(C,Θ) =
(Mt)t≥0 via
(5.25) Mt =
ˆ t
0
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
ds+G (Xt, Yt, 0, t) .
where G is as given in (5.21)(5.23).
Case 1: θ0 = 0 and x0 > 0: we show V = G. For these initial values the agent does not own
any units of asset for sale and onsumption an only be naned from liquid (ash) wealth. Then
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(Θt)t≥0 = 0, dXt = −Ctdt and the problem is non-stohasti. The andidate optimal onsumption
funtion is C(x, y, 0) = βx/R and the assoiated onsumption proess is C∗t =
β
Rx0e
− β
R
t
with
resulting wealth proess X∗t = x0e
− β
R
t
.
Then the value funtion is
E
[ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
C∗t
1−R
1−R
dt
]
=
ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
(
β
R
)1−R (e− βR tx0)1−R
1−R
dt
=
(
R
β
)R
x1−R0
1−R
= G(x0, y0, 0, 0),
where the last equality follows from (5.23). Hene, we have V ≥ G.
Now onsider general admissible strategies. Let M0 be given by M0t =Mt(Ct, 0). Applying It's
formula to M0, we get
M0t −M
0
0 =
ˆ t
0
[
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
− CsGx + αYsGy +
1
2
η2Y 2s Gyy +Gs
]
ds
+
ˆ t
0
ηYsGydBs
= N1t +N
3
t .
Lemma 24 implies that LG = 0 and hene N1t = 0.
Suppose R < 1. Then we have 0 ≤ M0t ≤ M
0
0 + N
3
t , and the loal martingale N
3
t is now
bounded from below and hene a supermartingale. Taking expetations we onlude E(M0t ) ≤
M00 = G(x0, y0, 0, 0), and hene
(5.26) G(x0, y0, 0, 0) ≥ E
ˆ t
0
e−βs
Cs
1−R
1−R
ds+ EG(Xt, Yt, 0, t) ≥ E
ˆ t
0
e−βs
Cs
1−R
1−R
ds,
Letting t→∞, (5.26) we onlude
G(x0, y0, 0, 0) ≥ E
ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
Ct
1−R
1−R
dt.
and taking a supremum over admissible strategies we have G ≥ V , and hene G = V .
For R > 1, a modiation of the proof of Theorem 14 applies here also and G = V .
Case 2: x0 = 0 and θ0 > 0: we show V ≥ G. Under the andidate optimal strategy dened
in Theorem 10 the onsumption and sale proesses evolve aording to Ctdt = −YtdΘt, meaning
that the investor nanes onsumption only from the sales of the endowed asset and wealth stays
onstant and identially zero. In this ase, the proposed strategies in (3.24) beome
Θ∗t = θ0e
− β
R
φt, C∗t =
β
R
φYtΘ
∗
t =
β
R
φy0θ0 exp
{
β(ǫ − δ2/2− φ/R)t+ δ
√
βBt
}
.
where temporarily we write φ = m(1) = δ2R(1−R)/2− ǫ(1−R) + 1 > 0.
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The orresponding value funtion is
G∗ = E
[ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
C∗t
1−R
1−R
dt
]
=
(
β
R
)1−R
(φy0θ0)
1−R
1−R
E
[ˆ ∞
0
e−βte(1−R)β(ǫ−
δ2
2 − φR )t+δ
√
β(1−R)Btdt
]
=
(
β
R
)1−R
(φy0θ0)
1−R
1−R
ˆ ∞
0
e{(ǫ(1−R)−
δ2
2 R(1−R)−1)− (1−R)R φ}βtdt
=
(
R
β
)1−R
(φy0θ0)
1−R
1−R
ˆ ∞
0
e−(βφ/R)tdt =
(
R
β
)R
(y0θ0)
1−R
1−R
φ−R = G(0, y0, θ0, 0).
Then, under the andidate optimal strategy,
G(0, y0, θ0, 0) = E
[ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
(C∗t )
1−R
1−R
dt
]
,
and we have G(0, y0, θ0, 0) ≤ V (0, y0, θ0, 0).
Case 3: x0 > 0 and θ0 > 0: we show V ≥ G. Let M
∗ = M(C∗,Θ∗) for the andidate optimal
strategies in Theorem 10.
From the form of the andidate value funtion we know that G is C1,2,1,1. Then applying It's
formula to M∗, we have
M∗t −M
∗
0 =
ˆ t
0
[
e−βs
(C∗s )
1−R
1−R
− C∗sGx + αYsGy +
1
2
η2Y 2s Gyy +Gt
]
ds
+
ˆ
(0,t]
(Gθ − YsGx) dΘs(5.27)
+
ˆ t
0
ηYsGydBs
=: N1t +N
2
t +N
3
t .
Sine C∗s = G
−1/R
x eβs/R is optimal and, by Lemma 24, LG = 0, we have N1t = 0. Further, under
the proposed strategies in (3.24), dΘt 6= 0 if and only if Xt = 0. Then, by Lemma 24,MG|x=0 = 0
and N2t = 0.
The following Lemma is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 25. (1) N3 given by N3t =
´ t
0 ηYsGy(X
∗
s , Ys,Θ
∗
s, s)dBs is a martingale.
(2) limt↑∞ E[G(X∗t , Yt,Θ
∗
t , t)] = 0
The onlusion that V ≥ G now follows exatly as in the proof of Theorem 7 but using Lemma 25
in plae of Lemma 21.
Case 4: x0 ≥ 0 and θ0 > 0: V ≤ G. To omplete the proof of the theorem, it remains to show
for θ0 > 0 and general admissible strategies, we have V (x0, y0, θ0, 0) ≤ G(x0, y0, θ0, 0). Reall the
denition of M in (5.25).
Applying the generalised It's formula [9, Setion 4.7℄ to Mt leads to the expression in (5.5) and
Mt −M0 = N
1
t +N
2
t +N
3
t +N
4
t .
Lemma 24 implies that under general admissible strategies, N1t ≤ 0, and N
2
t ≤ 0 with equality at
x = 0. Consider the jump term,
(5.28) N3t =
∑
0≤s≤t
[G (Xs, Ys,Θs, s)−G (Xs−, Ys,Θs−, s)−Gx(∆X)s −Gθ(∆Θ)s]
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Using the fat that (∆X)s = −Ys(∆Θ)s and writing θ = Θs−, x = Xs−, χ = −(∆Θ)s eah non-zero
jump in N3 is of the form
(∆N3)s = G(x + yχ, y, θ − χ, s)−G(x, y, θ, s) + χ [Gθ(x, y, θ, s)− yGx(x, y, θ, s)] .
Note that by Lemma 23, G(x+ yχ, y, θ − χ, s) is onave in χ and hene (∆N3) ≤ 0.
For the ase R < 1 the remainder of the proof follows as in the proof of Theorem 14. The ase
R > 1 for general admissible strategies is overed in Appendix C.

6. Comparative statis
In this setion, we provide omparative statis desribing how the outputs of the model depend
on market parameters. This setion onsists of ve parts, analysis of the optimal threshold z∗, the
value funtion g, the optimal onsumption C(x, y, θ), the utility indierene prie p(x, y, θ), and
the ost of illiquidity p∗(x, y, θ), and are based on our numerial results. The ost of illiquidity,
dened in (6.3) below represents the loss in ash terms faed by our agent when ompared with an
otherwise idential agent with the same initial portfolio who is able to adjust her portfolio of the
risky asset in either diretion at zero ost.
The equations desribing the funtion n and the rst rossing of m are simple to implement in
MATLAB, and then it also proved straightforward to alulate h or γ and thene the value funtion
in the non-degenerate ases. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 are generi plots of the various funtions used in
the onstrution of the value funtion. The parameter values are suh that we are in the seond
non-degenerate ase (ǫ ≥ δ2R and ǫ < δ
2R
2 +
1
1−R if R < 1), but the gures would be similar for
the rst non-degenerate ase (0 < ǫ < δ2R and ǫ < δ
2R
2 +
1
1−R if R < 1). The two gures over the
ases R < 1 and R > 1 respetively. For R < 1, as plotted in Figure 6.1, m and n are monotone
dereasing and W is inreasing on [1,∞) with limv→1W (v) = 0 and limv→∞W (v) = 1. Further,
we have γ(v) is inreasing on [1,∞) and g is onave and inreasing. For R > 1, as plotted in
Figure 6.2, m and n are monotone inreasing and W is dereasing on (0, 1] with limv→0W (v) = 1
and limv→1W (v) = 0. Finally, we have γ(v) is dereasing on (0, 1] and g is onvex dereasing and
onvergent to zero as z tends to innity.
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show that z∗ inreases as mean return ǫ inreases and dereases as volatility
δ inreases or risk aversion R inreases. As ǫ inreases, the non-traded asset Y beomes more
valuable and it is optimal for the investor to wait longer to sell Y for a higher return. For ǫ = 0,
when the endowed asset has zero return but with additional risk, the optimal strategy is to sell
immediately to remove the risk. Similarly, as δ inreases, the level of z∗ dereases as holding Y
involves additional risk. Hene, it is optimal for the investor to sell units of Y sooner in order to
mitigate this risk. As the risk aversion of the investor inreases, she is less tolerant to the risk of
the endowed asset and hene more inlined to sell Y earlier. As R → 0, (provided ǫ > 0) we have
z∗ →∞, whih implies the optimal strategy is never to sell the asset. In the limit the investor is not
onerned about the risk of holding the risky asset. Conversely, as R→∞, we have z∗ → 0. In this
ase, the investor annot tolerate any risks and it is therefore optimal to sell the asset immediately
to arrive at a safe position.
The value funtion as expressed via g in non-degenerate ases is plotted in Figures 6.5 and 6.6
under dierent drifts and risk aversions. These gures show that g is inreasing in drift while g
has no monotoniity in risk aversion. (A similar plot shows that g is dereasing in volatility.) As
the non-traded asset beomes more valuable, the investor an hoose optimal sale and onsumption
strategies whih lead to a larger value funtion. (Further, as the asset beomes more risky, the
additional risk makes the value funtion smaller.) Meanwhile, as ǫ inreases, z∗ in Figure 6.5 is
OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION AND SALE STRATEGIES FOR A RISK AVERSE AGENT 26
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
q
l, 
m
, n
 
 
 n
 l
 m
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
v
W
 
 
 W(v)
0 5 10 15 20
−5
0
5
10
v
γ
 
 
−5 0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
u
h
 
 
 γ(v)
 h(u)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
z
g
 
 
 g(z)
Figure 6.1. Transformations from m,n, ℓ toW (v) to γ(v) to h(u) and g(z) in the
seond non-degenerate senario in the ase R < 1. Parameters are ǫ = 1 δ = 1,
β = 0.1 and R = 0.5. For these parameters m is monotoni dereasing.
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Figure 6.2. Transformations from m,n, ℓ toW (v) to γ(v) to h(u) and g(z) in the
seond non-degenerate senario in the ase R > 1. Parameters are ǫ = 3 δ = 1,
β = 0.1 and R = 2.
dereasing (and as δ inreases, z∗ is inreasing). These results are onsistent with the results in
desribed in the previous paragraph. At z = z∗, smooth t onditions are satised. Observe
also that for dierent values of drift, we nonetheless have that g starts at the same point. This
orresponds to the value funtion when θ0 = 0 whereby onsumption is only naned by initial
wealth and the problem is deterministi. In this ase, we have g(0) = (R/β)R.
Optimal onsumption C(x, y, θ) is onsidered in Figures 6.76.9. Figure 6.7 plots the optimal
onsumption C(1, 1, θ) as a funtion of endowed units θ and shows that the optimal onsumption
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Figure 6.3. z∗ inreases as ǫ inreases or as δ inreases. Here β = 0.1 and R = 0.5.
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Figure 6.4. z∗ dereases as R inreases or as ǫ dereases. Here δ = 3 and β = 0.1.
inreases in θ: as the size of the holdings of the non-traded asset Y inreases, the agent feels riher
and hene onsumes at a faster rate. For θ = 0, the optimal onsumption C(x, y, 0) = xg(0)−
1
R =
β
Rx is stritly positive and is naned from ash wealth. Figure 6.7 also suggests that the optimal
onsumption C(1, 1, θ) dereases in risk aversion. Given the set of parameters the ritial risk
aversion (i.e. the boundary between the two non-degenerate ases) is at R = ǫ/δ2 = 0.75. For the
bottom two lines in Figure 6.7 with R > 0.75, we have ǫ < δ2R and this falls into the rst non-
degenerate ase with nite z∗. For R ≤ 0.75, we have ǫ ≥ δ2R, whih is the seond non-degenerate
ase with innite z∗. As we see, there is no disontinuity in onsumption with respet to risk
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Figure 6.5. g(z) with dierent ǫ in the rst and seond non-degenerate senarios.
Dotted line: z ≥ z∗, solid line: z ≤ z∗ and dots represent z∗. ǫ varies from top
to bottom as 2, 1.5, 1, 0.5, with xed parameters δ = 2, β = 0.1 and R = 0.5.
The top line is the value funtion g in the seond non-degenerate senario given
ǫ = δ2R = 2 and z∗ is innite.
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Figure 6.6. g(z) with dierent risk aversion R in the rst and seond non-
degenerate senarios. In the left graph, R takes values in 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9. The
rest of the parameters are ǫ = 3, δ = 2, β = 0.1. The ritial risk aversion is
R = ǫ/δ2 = 0.75. The dots represent nite z∗ and the solid line is the value fun-
tion g in the seond non-degenerate senario with innite z∗. In the right graph,
R takes values in 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 and the rest of the parameters are ǫ = 6, δ = 2
and β = 0.1.
aversion at either R = 0.75 or R = 1. The optimal onsumptions for dierent risk aversions dier
primarily in the levels, and the dominant fator is the optimal onsumption for θ = 0. As argued
above C(x, y, 0) = βx/R is dereasing in R.
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Figure 6.7. Optimal onsumption C(1, 1, θ) as R varies. R takes values in 0.6,
0.75, 0.9, 1.05 with parameters ǫ = 3, δ = 2, β = 0.1 and θ ∈ [0, 1]. The ritial risk
aversion is R = ǫ/δ2 = 0.75. The top two lines orrespond to the optimal onsump-
tion in the seond non-degenerate senario where z∗ is innite under the ondition
that ǫ ≥ δ2R. The bottom two lines orrespond to the rst non-degenerate ase
with nite z∗.
Figure 6.8 plots both onsumption as a funtion of wealth C(x, 1, 1) and the ratio of onsumption
to wealth C(x, 1, 1)/x as a funtion of x with dierent risk aversions. Note that this an only be
shown for x > yθ/z∗ = 1/z∗ sine if x < 1/z∗ the agent makes an immediate sale of units of
risky asset. The ritial value of the risk aversion is R = ǫ/δ2 = 0.75. For R > 0.75, we have
z∗ < ∞ and x∗ = 1/z∗ > 0 while for R ≤ 0.75, z∗ = ∞ and x∗ = 1/z∗ = 0. The results show
that the optimal rate of onsumption is an inreasing funtion of wealth but that onsumption per
unit wealth is a dereasing funtion of wealth. (In the standard Merton problem, onsumption
is proportional to wealth.) As the agent beomes riher, she onsumes more, but the fration of
wealth that she onsumes beomes smaller. The explanation is that her endowed wealth is being
held onstant. By saling we have that if both x and θ are inreased by the same fator, then
onsumption would also rise by the same fator, but here x is inreasing, but θ (and y) are held
onstant, and hene onsumption inreases more slowly than wealth. In the limit x→ ∞ we have
limx→∞ C(x, 1, 1) =∞ and limx→∞ C(x, y, θ)/x = g(0)−
1
R = β/R.
Figure 6.9 plots the optimal onsumption C(1, 1, θ) as a funtion of θ and ǫ. Here we nd a rst
surprising result: we might expet the optimal onsumption C(x, y, θ) to be inreasing in the drift,
but this is not the ase for large θ. For an explanation of this phenomena, reall that the optimal
exerise ratio z∗ is inreasing in the drift. As the drift inreases, the asset has a more promising
return on average whih makes the agent feel riher and onsume at a higher rate. However, a larger
drift also implies a larger z∗, indiating that the agent should postpone the sale of the risky asset.
Hene, a larger drift involves more risk, and in order to mitigate this risk, the agent onsumes less in
the short term. Hene, the optimal onsumption dereases in the drift for large θ. We nd similar
results if we onsider C(1, 1, θ) as a funtion of δ. Optimal onsumption is not neessarily dereasing
in volatility and onsumption an be inreasing in volatility for large values of θ. Analogously, if we
plot C(x, 1, 1) we nd that onsumption is a dereasing (inreasing) funtion of return ǫ if wealth
x is small (large).
OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION AND SALE STRATEGIES FOR A RISK AVERSE AGENT 30
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 11
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
x
C(
x,1
,1)
 
 
0.05 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
x
C(
x,1
,1)
/x
 
 
 R = 0.6
 R = 0.75
 R = 0.9
 R = 1.05
 R = 0.6
 R = 0.75
 R = 0.9
 R = 1.05
Figure 6.8. Optimal onsumption C(x, 1, 1) and C(x, 1, 1)/x as R varies. R takes
values in 0.6, 0.75, 0.9 and 1.05 with parameters ǫ = 3, δ = 2, y0 = 1 and θ0 = 1.
The dots represent x∗ = 1/z∗ and the ritial risk aversion is R = ǫ/δ2 = 0.75.
In both graphs, the top two lines orrespond to the optimal onsumptions in the
seond non-degenerate ase with x∗ = 0. The bottom two lines are the optimal
onsumptions in the rst non-degenerate ase with nite z∗, or equivalently, x∗ > 0.
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Figure 6.9. Optimal onsumption C(1, 1, θ) as ǫ varies. ǫ takes values in 0.5, 1,
1.5 and 2 with parameters δ = 2, β = 0.1, R = 0.5, x0 = 1 and y0 = 1. The ritial
mean return is ǫ = δ2R = 2. When ǫ = 2 we are in the seond non-degenerate
ase.
Figures 6.106.13 plot the utility indierene prie or ertainty equivalene value p(x, y, θ).
Reall that in the seond and third ases of Theorem 4 the ertainty equivalent value of the non-
traded asset is given by
p(x, y, θ) = x
g
(
yθ
x
)
g(0)

1
1−R
− x
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Figure 6.10. Indierene prie p(x, 1, 1) as ǫ varies. ǫ varies from top to bottom
as 2.5, 2.1, 1.5, 1 with xed parameters δ = 2, β = 0.1, R = 0.5, θ0 = 1 and y0 = 1.
The dots represent x∗ = 1/z∗ and the ritial mean return is ǫ = δ2R = 2.
Figures 6.10 and 6.11 onsider the indierene prie as a funtion of wealth. Dots in gures represent
the optimal exerise ratio z∗ = yθ/x. In eah of the gures we hoose a range of parameter values
suh that sometimes we are in the rst non-degenerate ase, and sometimes in the seond non-
degenerate ase. In Figure 6.10, for ǫ < 2, we have z∗ < ∞ and x∗ = 1/z∗ > 0, and for ǫ ≥ 2,
we have z∗ = ∞ and x∗ = 0. We an see p(x, 1, 1) is onave and inreasing in x. It follows from
Theorem 7 that g(z) = (R/β)Rm(q∗)−R(1 + z)1−R for z ≥ z∗. Further, under the ondition that
0 < ǫ < δ2R and ǫ < δ
2
2 R+
1
1−R , whih ensures a nite exerise ratio,
lim
x→0
p(x, y, θ) = lim
x→0
x

g
(
yθ
x
)
g(0)

1
1−R
− 1
 = limx→0
{
m(q∗)
R
R−1 (x+ yθ)− x
}
= m(q∗)
R
R−1 yθ > yθ.
In that ase, for x = 0, where no initial wealth is available to nane onsumption, it is optimal for
the investor to sell some units of the endowed asset Y immediately so as to keep the ratio of the
wealth invested in the endowed asset to liquid wealth below z∗, i.e. from the initial portfolio (x = 0,
θ = Θ0−) the agent moves to (x = X0+, θ = Θ0+), where Θ0+ = z
∗
1+z∗Θ0− and X0+ =
1
1+z∗ yΘ0−.
The monotoniity of p(x, 1, 1) in ǫ and δ is also illustrated in Figures 6.10 and 6.11: a higher mean
return adds value to the asset, while the inreasing volatility makes Y more risky and redues value.
Also observe that for the drift larger than the ritial value, the hange in drift does not move the
dot (representing the ritial ratio) while for the drift smaller than the ritial value, the dot moves
rightwards as drift inreases. To the left of the dot, the agent should sell the endowed asset initially,
while to the right of the dot, the agent should wait. As drift inreases, the agent should wait longer
for a higher return when selling the asset.
Figure 6.12 onsiders the indierene prie p(1, 1, θ) and unit indierene prie p(1, 1, θ)/θ as a
funtion of θ. We see that p(1, 1, θ) is inreasing in θ and for θ = 0, p(1, 1, 0) = 0, reeting the fat
that a null holding is worth nothing. We also have the unit prie p(1, 1, θ)/θ is dereasing in the
units of asset θ. For small holdings, the marginal prie limθ→0 p(1, 1, θ)/θ is innite. As θ → ∞,
the gures imply that the unit prie p(1, 1, θ)/θ tends to some onstant larger than the unit prie
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Figure 6.11. Indierene prie p(x, 1, 1). δ varies from top to bottom as 2.1, 2.4,
2.8 and 3.2 with xed parameters ǫ = 3, β = 0.1, R = 0.5, θ0 = 1 and y0 = 1.
The dots represent x∗ = 1/z∗ and the ritial volatility is δ =
√
ǫ/R = 2.45. The
top two lines orrespond to the indierene pries in the seond non-degenerate
ase with x∗ = 0. The bottom two lines are indierene pries in the rst non-
degenerate ase with x∗ > 0.
y of Y :
lim
θ→∞
p(x, y, θ)
θ
= lim
θ→∞
x
[
g( yθx )
g(0)
] 1
1−R
− x
θ
= lim
θ→∞
m(q∗)
R
R−1 (x+ yθ)− x
θ
= m(q∗)
R
R−1 y > y,
where the seond equality follows sine for z ≥ z∗, we have g(z) = (R/β)Rm(q∗)−R(1 + z)1−R.
Figure 6.12 also illustrates the monotoniity of p in the drift parameter ǫ and we have p(1, 1, θ)
and p(1, 1, θ)/θ both inrease in the drift. Similarly, it an be shown that p(1, 1, θ) and p(1, 1, θ)/θ
are both dereasing in δ, reeting the inreased riskiness of positions as volatility inreases.
Figure 6.13 plots the indierene prie as a funtion of ash wealth for dierent risk aversions.
Naively we might expet the prie to be monotone dereasing in risk aversion - a more risk averse
agent will assign a lower value to a risky asset. However, the results show that this not the ase, and
for large wealths the utility indierene prie is inreasing in R. (If we x wealth x and onsider
the ertainty equivalent value as a funtion of quantity θ then we nd a similar reversal, and the
ertainty equivalent value is inreasing in R for small θ.)
An explanation of this phenomena is as follows. Consider an agent with positive ash wealth
and zero endowment of the risky asset. This agent onsumes at rate βx/R; in partiular, as the
parameter R inreases, the agent onsumes more slowly. The introdution of a small endowment
will not hange this result, and in general, an inrease in the parameter R postpones the time at
whih the ritial ratio reahes z∗. (Although z∗ depends on R also, this is a seondary eet.)
Sine the endowed asset is appreiating, on average, by the time the agent hooses to start selling
the asset, it will be worth more. The total eet is to make the indierene prie inreasing in R.
Similarly, the indierene prie p(1, 1, θ) and the unit indierene prie p(1, 1, θ)/θ as funtions of
θ are not neessarily monotone in risk aversion.
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Figure 6.12. Indierene prie p(1, 1, θ) and unit prie p(1, 1, θ)/θ. ǫ varies from
top to bottom as 2, 1.5, 1, 0.5 with xed parameters δ = 2, β = 0.1, R = 0.5,
x0 = 1 and y0 = 1. The dots represent θ
∗ = z∗ and the ritial mean return is
ǫ = δ2R = 2. The top line orresponds to the indierene prie in the seond
non-degenerate ase with innite z∗.
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Figure 6.13. Indierene prie p(x, 1, 1). R takes values in 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 and
1.2 with xed parameters ǫ = 3, δ = 2, β = 0.1, y0 = 1 and θ0 = 1. The dots
represent x∗ = 1/z∗ and the ritial risk aversion is R = ǫ/δ2 = 0.75. The top
two lines for x ∈ [0, 1] orrespond to the indierene pries in the seond non-
degenerate ase with x∗ = 0. The bottom two lines are indierene pries in the
rst non-degenerate ase with x∗ > 0.
Finally, we onsider the impat of the illiquidity assumption. We do this by onsidering the
value funtion of our agent who annot buy the endowed asset and omparing it with the value
funtion of an otherwise idential agent, but who an both buy and sell the endowed asset with
zero transation osts. Suppose parameters are suh that we are in the seond ase of Theorem 4.
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In the illiquid market, where Y is only allowed for sale, Theorem 7 proves the value funtion is
(6.1) VI(x, y, θ, 0) =
x1−R
1−R
g
(
yθ
x
)
= sup
(C,Θ)
E
[ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
C1−Rt
1−R
dt
]
,
where the newly introdued subsript I stands for the value funtion in the illiquid market, in whih
the asset an only be sold.
In a liquid market suh that Y an be dynamially traded, wealth evolves as dXt = −Ctdt +
ΠtdYt/Yt. Here (Π)t≥0 represents the portfolio proess. We suppose the agent is endowed with Θ0
units of Y initially and is onstrained to keep X positive. This is Merton's model and we know the
optimal strategy is to keep a onstant fration of wealth in the risky asset. The initial endowment
therefore only hanges initial wealth and the value funtion is
(6.2) VL(x, y, θ, 0) = sup
(C,Π)
E
[ˆ ∞
0
e−βt
C1−Rt
1−R
dt
]
=
(x+ yθ)1−R
1− R
[
β
R
−
α2(1−R)
2σ2R2
]−R
,
where the subsript L stands for the value funtion in the liquid market.
Now we onsider the ost of illiquidity.
Denition 26. The ost of illiquidity, denoted p∗ = p∗(x, y, θ) is the solution to
(6.3) VL(x− p
∗, y, θ, t) = VI(x, y, θ, t).
and represents the amount of ash wealth the agent who an only sell the risky asset would be
prepared to forgo, in order to be able to trade the risky asset with zero transation osts.
Equating (6.1) and (6.2), we an solve for p∗ to obtain
(6.4) p∗(x, y, θ) = x
[
1 +
yθ
x
− g
(
yθ
x
) 1
1−R
(
β
R
−
α2(1−R)
2σ2R2
) R
1−R
]
.
Consider (6.4) when θ = 0, where the investor is not endowed any units of Y initially, we have
p∗(x, y, 0) = x
[
1−
(
β
R
−
α2(1−R)
2σ2R2
) R
1−R
g(0)
1
1−R
]
= x
[
1−
(
1−
ǫ2(1 −R)
2δ2R
) R
1−R
]
> 0.
Suppose R < 1, 0 < ǫ < δ
2
2 R+
1
1−R and ǫ < δ
2R, so that z∗ is nite. Figure 6.14 plots p∗(1, 1, θ)
for θ ∈ [0, 10]. Notie that p∗ dereases initially, has a stritly positive minimum near 0.95 and
then inreases, before beoming linear beyond θ = z∗. Clearly, whatever the initial endowment of
the agent, she has a smaller set of admissible strategies than an agent who an trade dynamially,
and the ost of liquidity is stritly positive. For small initial endowments the agent would like to
inrease the size of her portfolio of the risky asset, and the smaller her initial endowment the more
she would like to purhase at time zero. Hene the ost of illiquidity is dereasing in θ for small
θ. However, for large θ, the agent would like to make an initial transation (to redue the ratio
of wealth held in the risky asset to ash wealth to below z∗), and indeed sine she is free to do
so, her optimal strategy involves suh a transation at time zero. Hene for large wealth the ost
of liquidity is proportional to (x + yθ), and hene is inreasing in θ. For this reason, the ost of
illiquidity is a U-shaped funtion of θ.
Appendix A. Properties of n
Reall the denitions of m and ℓ and the dierential equation (3.6) for n, and also the denitions
of qℓ, qm, qn and q
∗
. Dene q˜ = inf{q > 0 : (1−R)n(q) ≥ (1−R)ℓ(q)} ∧ 1. Note that m (0) = 1 =
ℓ (0) and m (1) = 1− ǫ(1−R) + δ2R (1−R) /2 = ℓ (1). The onave funtion ℓ is positive on (0, 1)
if ℓ(1) = 1− ǫ(1−R) + δ2R (1−R) /2 ≥ 0.
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Figure 6.14. Cost of illiquidity p∗(1, 1, θ) as θ varies. Parameters are ǫ = 1, δ = 2
and R = 0.5. Here, we x x0 = y0 = 1 and θ ∈ [0, 1]. For the orresponding Merton
problem with dynami trading in Y we have that it is optimal to invest a onstant
fration zM = ǫδ2R−ǫ in the risky asset. Reall Remark 9 and observe that z
M ≤ z∗.
Lemma 27. (1) Dene Φ via
Φ(χ) = χ2 − (1 −R)
(
δ2
2
− ǫ+
1
R
)
χ− ǫ
(1−R)2
R
.
Then for R ∈ (0, 1), n′(0) is the smaller root of Φ(χ) = 0 and for R ∈ (1,∞), n′(0) is the
larger root.
(2) For q ∈ (0, qn ∧ q˜), n
′(q) > 0 if and only if n(q) < m(q), similarly n′(q) = 0 if and only if
n(q) = m(q).
(3) If ℓ(1) ≥ 0 then q˜ = qn = qℓ = 1.
(4) If ℓ(1) < 0 then q˜ = qn = qℓ < q
∗
.
(5) If 0 ≤ q∗ < 1 then q∗ > ǫ/δ2R and (1−R)m is inreasing on (q∗, 1).
Proof. (1) From the expression (3.6) and l'Hpital's rule, n′(0) = χ solves
χ =
1−R
R
−
δ2
2
(1−R)2
R
1
(1−R)( δ
2
2 − ǫ)− χ
,
or equivalently Φ(χ) = 0. Further ℓ′(0) = (1 −R)
(
δ2
2 − ǫ
)
and
Φ
(
(1−R)
(
δ2
2
− ǫ
))
= −
δ2
2
(1−R)2
R
< 0.
For R < 1, we have n′(0) < ℓ′(0) by hypothesis, so that n′(0) is the smaller root of Φ. For R > 1,
we have n′(0) > ℓ′(0) by hypothesis and n′(0) is the larger root of Φ.
(2) This follows immediately from the expression for n′(q).
(3) Suppose R < 1. Sine n′(0) < ℓ′(0) we have q˜ > 0. Notie that if 0 < n(q) < ℓ(q) and
ℓ(q) − n(q) is suiently small, then n′(q) < ℓ′(q). Hene q˜ ≥ qn. Further, if n (q) < ℓ (q) − φ for
some φ > 0 on some interval
[
q, q
]
⊂ (0, 1), then n′ (q) /n (q) is bounded below by a onstant on
that interval and provided n
(
q
)
> 0 it follows that n (q) > 0 also. Hene, if ℓ is positive on [0, 1)
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then so is n and qn = 1. For R > 1, we have n
′(0) > ℓ′(0) and the result follows via a similar
argument.
(4) Suppose R < 1. The same argument as above gives that q˜ = qn = qℓ and now these quantities
are less than one. Clearly qm < qℓ, and m is dereasing on (0, qm). We annot have q
∗ ≤ qm for
then n′(q∗) − m′(q∗) > 0 and n(q∗) − m(q∗) = 0 ontraditing the minimality of q∗, nor an we
have qm < q
∗ ≤ qℓ for on this region m < 0 ≤ n.
(5) We an only have q∗ < 1 if m(1) > 0 and (1 − R)m′(1) > 0. For R < 1 we must have
n′(q∗) = 0 < m′(q∗). But m has a minimum at ǫ/δ2R, so q∗ > ǫ/δ2R. For R > 1, we must have
n′(q∗) = 0 > m′(q∗). But m has a maximum at ǫ/δ2R, so q∗ > ǫ/δ2R.

Proof of Proposition 1. (1) Note that Φ(m′(0)) = (1 − R)2δ2ǫ/2. Then, if ǫ < 0 we have n′(0) <
m′(0) for R < 1 and q∗ = 0. Otherwise, for R > 1, we have n′(0) > m′(0) and q∗ = 0. If ǫ = 0 then
n′(0) = m′(0) and more are is needed.
Consider R < 1. Sine ǫ ≤ 0, m is inreasing. Suppose n (qˆ) > m (qˆ) for some qˆ in [0, 1] . Let
q = sup {q < qˆ : n (q) = m (q)}. Then on
(
q, qˆ
)
we have n′ (q) < 0 < m′ (q) and m (qˆ) − n (qˆ) =
m
(
q
)
− n
(
q
)
+
´ qˆ
q
[m′ (y)− n′ (y)]dy > 0, a ontradition.
For R > 1, the only dierene is that m is dereasing given ǫ ≤ 0 and n′(0) > m′(0).
(2) Consider rst R < 1 and suppose that 0 < ǫ < min{δ2R, δ
2
2 R +
1
1−R}. Then m
′ (1) > 0
and m(1) > 0. Sine ǫ > 0 we have n′ (0) > m′ (0) and n −m is positive at least initially. Write
n (q) = m (q) + δ2 (1−R) qb (q) /2. Then n (q) ≤ ℓ (q) implies b (q) ≤ 1− q.
Suppose b (q) > 0 for all q ∈ (0, 1). Then n (q) ≥ m (q) and n′ (q) < 0 so that n (q) ≥ n (1) =
m (1) and
m (1) = m (q)− (1− q) (1−R)
(
ǫ− δ2R
)
− (1− q)
2
δ2R (1−R) /2
> m (q) + φ (1− q) δ2 (1−R) q/2,
for q > ǫ/δ2R and φ < (δ2R− ǫ)min{ 2δ2 ,
R
ǫ }. For suh q, b (q) > φ (1− q). Hene
n′ (q)
n (q)
= −
1−R
R
b (q)
(1− q) (1− q − b (q))
≤ −
1−R
R
φ
(1− q) (1− φ)
and we must have n′ (1−) = −∞ ontraditing the fat that n (q) ≤ ℓ (q). It follows that we must
have b (q) = 0 for some q ∈ (0, 1). At this point n rossesm. Note that this rossing point is unique:
at any rossing point m′ (q) > 0 = n′ (q), so that all rossings of 0 in (0, 1) by n−m are from above
to below.
For R > 1, we have m′(1) < 0 and m(1) > 0. Sine ǫ > 0, we have n′(0) < m′(0) and n −m
is negative initially. Let n(q) = m(q) + δ2(1 − R)qb(q)/2. Then n(q) ≥ ℓ(q) implies b(q) ≤ 1 − q.
Suppose b(q) > 0 for all q ∈ (0, 1), then it leads to the same ontradition for R < 1. It follows that
b(q) = 0 for some q ∈ (0, 1), where n rosses m. At any rossing point m′(q) < 0 = n′(q), so that n
rosses m from below.
(3) ǫ ≥ δ2R and if R < 1, ǫ < δ
2
2 R +
1
1−R .
Consider rst R < 1. Sine ǫ > 0 we have that n′ (0) > m′ (0) and n > m in a neighbourhood to
the right of zero. Further, m is dereasing and there are no solutions of n = m sine at any solution
we must have that 0 = n′ < m′ < 0.
For R > 1, we have m is inreasing and n′(0) < m′(0). There are no solutions of n = m in that
at any solution we should have 0 = n′ > m′ > 0.
(4) R < 1 and ǫ ≥ δ
2
2 R+
1
1−R
Then m (1) ≤ 0. Sine m is dereasing at least until it hits zero, and sine n′ = 0 at a rossing
point we annot have that n rosses m before it hits zero. 
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Proof of Proposition 15. (1) N solves
N ′ (q) =
1
2δ
2 (1−R)
2
qN (q)
ℓ (q)−N (q)
−1/R
(1− q)
1−1/R
and N is stritly inreasing for R < 1. Otherwise, it is dereasing for R > 1. W solves
(A.1) W ′ (v) =
ℓ (W (v))− v−1/R (1−W (v))1−1/R
1
2δ
2 (1−R)
2
vW (v)
(2) Follows from (3.9) and (A.1).
(3) Consider rst R < 1. On (0, q∗) we have n(q) > m(q) and then ℓ(q)− n(q) < ℓ(q)−m(q) =
q(1− q)δ2(1−R)/2. Then v−1/R(1−W (v))1−1/R = n(W (v)) and
v(1−R)W ′(v) =
ℓ(W (v))− n(W (v))
δ2
2 (1−R)W (v)
< 1−W (v)
It follows that w′(v) = (1−R)W (v) + v(1−R)W ′(v) < 1−RW (v). At q∗, n(q∗) = m(q∗) and the
inequality beomes an equality throughout.
For R > 1, we have n(q) < m(q) on (0, q∗) and ℓ(q)− n(q) > ℓ(q)−m(q) = q(1− q)δ2(1−R)/2.
Then again v(1 −R)W ′(v) < 1−W (v) and w′(v) < 1−RW (v) with equality at h∗.
Note that sine W is non-negative, 1−RW (h) ≤ 1. 
Appendix B. The martingale property of the value funtion
Proof of Lemma 21. First we want to show the the loal martingale
N3t =
ˆ t
0
ηYsGy(X
∗
s , Ys,Θ
∗
s, s)dBs
is a martingale. This will follow if, for example,
(B.1) E
ˆ t
0
(YsGy(X
∗
s , Ys,Θ
∗
s, s))
2 ds <∞
for eah t > 0. From the form of the value funtion (5.11), we have
(B.2) yGy(x, y, θ, s) = e
−βt x
1−R
1−R
zg′ (z) = G (x, y, θ, t)
zg′ (z)
g (z)
≤ (1 −R)G (x, y, θ, t)
where we use that
zg′(z)
g(z) =
w(h)
h = (1−R)W (h) and 0 ≤W (h) ≤ 1.
Dene a proess (Dt)t≥0 by Dt = lnG (X
∗
t , Yt,Θ
∗
t , t). Then D solves
Dt −D0 =
ˆ t
0
1
G
(
Gt − C
∗
sGx + αYsGy +
1
2
η2Y 2s Gyy
)
ds
+
ˆ t
0
1
G
(Gθ − YsGx) dΘs +
ˆ t
0
1
G
ηYsGydBs −
ˆ t
0
1
2G2
η2Y 2s G
2
yds
= −
ˆ t
0
e−
β
R
s
1−R
1
G
G
R−1
R
x ds+
ˆ t
0
1
G
ηYsGydBs −
ˆ t
0
1
2G2
η2Y 2s G
2
yds.
It follows that the andidate value funtion along the optimal trajetory has the representation
(B.3) G (X∗t , Yt,Θ
∗
t , t) = G (X
∗
0 , y0,Θ
∗
0, 0) exp
{
−
ˆ t
0
e−
1
R
βs
1−R
1
G
G
R−1
R
x ds
}
Ht
where H = (Ht)t≥0 is the exponential martingale
Ht = E
(
ηYsGy
G
◦B
)
t
:= exp
{ˆ t
0
1
G
ηYsGydBs −
ˆ t
0
1
2G2
η2Y 2s G
2
yds
}
.
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Note that (B.2) implies
1
GηyGy ≤ η(1 − R), so that H is indeed a martingale, and not merely a
loal martingale.
From (B.2) and (B.3), we have
(yGy)
2
= G (X0, y0,Θ0, 0)
2
(
zg′ (z)
g (z)
)2
× exp
{
−2
ˆ t
0
e−
1
R
βs
(1−R)
1
G
G
R−1
R
x ds
}
H2t
≤ G (X0, y0,Θ0, 0)
2
(1−R)2H2t .
But
H2t = E
(
2
G
ηYsGy ◦B
)
t
exp
{ˆ t
0
1
G2
η2Y 2s G
2
yds
}
≤ E
(
2
G
ηYsGy ◦B
)
t
e(1−R)
2η2t.
Hene E[H2t ] ≤ e
(1−R)2η2t
and it follows that (B.1) holds for every t, and hene that the loal
martingale N3t =
´ t
0 ηyGydBs is a martingale under the optimal strategy.
(ii) Consider
´ t
0
e−
1
R
βs
1−R
1
GG
R−1
R
x ds. To date we have merely argued that this funtion is inreasing
in t. Now we want to argue that it grows to innity at least linearly. By (5.11), we have
e−
1
R
βt
1−R
1
G
G
R−1
R
x =
[
g (z)− 11−Rzg
′ (z)
]R−1
R
g (z)
=
[
h− 11−Rw (h)
]R−1
R
h
= (1−W (h))1−1/Rh−1/R = n(W (h)) ≥ min{1, n(W (h∗))} > 0.
Hene from (B.3) there exists a onstant k > 0 suh that
0 ≤ (1 −R)G(X∗t , Yt,Θ
∗
t , t) ≤ (1 −R)G(x0, y0, θ0, 0)e
−ktHt → 0
and then G→ 0 in L1, as required. 
Proof of Lemma 25. This follows exatly as in the proof of Lemma 21.

Appendix C. Extension to R > 1
Veriation Lemmas for the ase R > 1. It remains to extend the proofs of the veriation lemmas
to the ase R > 1. In partiular we need to show that the andidate value funtion is an upper
bound on the value funtion. The main idea is taken from Davis and Norman [5℄.
Suppose G (x, y, θ, t) is the andidate value funtion. Consider for ε > 0,
(C.1) V˜ε(x, y, θ, t) = V˜ (x, y, θ, t) = G (x+ ε, y, θ, t)
and M˜t = M˜t(C,Θ) given by
M˜t =
ˆ t
0
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
ds+ V˜ (Xt, Yt,Θt, t) ,
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Then,
M˜t − M˜0 =
ˆ t
0
[
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
− CsV˜x + αYsV˜y +
1
2
η2Y 2s V˜yy + V˜t
]
ds
+
ˆ t
0
(
V˜θ − YsV˜x
)
dΘs
+
∑
0≤s≤t
[
V˜ (Xs, Ys,Θs, s)− V˜ (Xs−, Ys−,Θs−, s−)− V˜x(△X)s − V˜θ(△Θ)s
]
+
ˆ t
0
ηYsV˜ydBs
= N˜1t + N˜
2
t + N˜
3
t + N˜
4
t .
Lemma 13 (in the ase ǫ ≤ 0 and otherwise Lemma 19 or Lemma 24) implies N˜1t ≤ 0 and N˜
2
t ≤ 0.
The onavity of V˜ (x+yχ, y, θ−χ, s) in χ (either diretly if ǫ ≤ 0, or using Lemma 18 or Lemma 23)
implies (∆N˜3) ≤ 0.
Now dene stopping times τn = inf
{
t ≥ 0 :
´ t
0
η2Y 2s V˜
2
y ds ≥ n
}
. It follows from (B.2) that yV˜y
is bounded and hene τn ↑ ∞. Then the loal martingale (N˜
4
t∧τn)t≥0 is a martingale and taking
expetations we have E
(
M˜t∧τn
)
≤ M˜0, and hene
E
(ˆ t∧τn
0
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
ds+ V˜ (Xt∧τn , Yt∧τn ,Θt∧τn , t ∧ τn)
)
≤ V˜ (x0, y0, θ0, 0) .
In the ase ǫ ≤ 0, (5.1) and (C.1) imply
V˜ (x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
(x+ ε)
1−R
1−R
(
1 +
yθ
x+ ε
)1−R(
R
β
)R
≥ e−βt
(x+ ε)
1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
≥
ε1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
.
Thus V˜ is bounded, lim
n→∞
EV˜ (Xt∧τn , Yt∧τn ,Θt∧τn, t ∧ τn) = E
[
V˜ (Xt, Yt, θt, t)
]
, and
V˜ (x0, y0, θ0, 0) ≥ E
(ˆ t
0
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
ds
)
+ E
[
V˜ (Xt, Yt,Θt, t)
]
.
Similarly,
V˜ (x, y, θ, t) ≥ e−βt
ε1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
and hene E
[
V˜ (Xt, Yt,Θt, t)
]
→ 0. Then letting t → ∞ and applying the monotone onvergene
theorem, we have
V˜ε (x0, y0, θ0, 0) = V˜ (x0, y0, θ0, 0) ≥ E
(ˆ ∞
0
e−βs
C1−Rs
1−R
ds
)
Finally let ε→ 0. Then V ≤ limε↓0 V˜ = G. Hene, we have V ≤ G.
The two non-degenerate ases are very similar, exept that now from (5.11) and (C.1),
V˜ (x, y, θ, t) = e−βt
(x+ ε)
1−R
1−R
g
(
yθ
x+ ε
)
≥ e−βt
ε1−R
1−R
(
R
β
)R
.
where we use that for R > 1, g is dereasing with g (0) = (Rβ )
R > 0. Hene V˜ is bounded, and the
argument proeeds as before.

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